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General Introduction
This thesis — as suggested by its title – aims to investigate whether distinctive strategies
(i.e. strategies deviating from a norm) implemented by active managers1 could provide added
value to their investors. This debate has been at the heart of the financial literature since the
1950’s and led to the current consensus which points to the inability of active managers to
generate abnormal performance persistently. Yet, seminal papers on which this consensus is
based were mostly conducted prior to the 2000’s and exclusively focused on US data, arguing
than the results were canon to the rest of the industry. Hence, we highlight two weaknesses
of the current literature. First, in the last 20 years, the global asset management industry
has witnessed drastic changes in its structure, its competition level and its size, fostering
new studies actually finding evidence against the consensus. Second, the European asset
management market has grown to be the second largest on a global scale (after the US)
and recent studies uncovered that its properties were substantially different from the ones
of the US market. Therefore, we argue that conclusions drawn by seminal papers regarding
mutual funds performance and managerial skills across the globe may not hold in current
market conditions. Against this background, our aim through this thesis is to contribute
to this research body by studying how investors (either individual or institutional) around
the world, and especially in Europe, could distinguish effective strategies and benefit from
actively managed funds. Taking into account the increased heterogeneity and complexity of
the industry, its growth and development worldwide, we argue that studying how investors
may identify the best potential opportunities (i.e. best fund managers) relatively to those
available has never been more crucial. This thesis is thus divided into three paper-based
chapters, each proposing an original approach that contributes to this specific debate. Chap-
ter 1 proposes a market based approach — usable by individual or institutional investors
alike— to distinguish active managers implementing distinctive strategies in the European
market. Chapter 2, using portfolio holdings data, investigates strategies using portfolio con-
1As opposed to passive managers which simply track a specific indexes
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centration in stocks and/or risk exposures to generate abnormal returns in the European
market2. Finally, chapter 3 looks at socially responsible investments (SRI) funds in the US
and challenges the conventional wisdom which states that the restrictions imposed by ethical
considerations on their investment universe will necessarily lead them to under-perform more
conventional funds.
The Asset Management Industry Evolution
The asset management industry is an integral part of the global financial system, as the
banking and insurance industries are. Yet, it stands out from its counterparts given its
diversity and unique structure. Indeed, asset management firms do not own their assets under
management (AuM)3 but rather owe fiduciary duties to clients, hence have the obligation to
act in their best interest. As such, clients’ assets are not guaranteed4, yet are not tied to the
asset management firm status. In other words, the firm assets and its client assets are legally
separated and the later cannot be used in case of a failure.
Turning to the industry’s diversity, on a global scale the number of investment strategies
offered through the different types of investment funds such as —to cite a few– mutual funds
(equity, bonds, mixed or money market), index funds, hedge funds and private funds is
staggering. Yet, overall the strategies can be distributed into two main management styles:
the so-called passive and active ones. A passively managed investment fund proposes to track
a specific index as closely as possible (buy and hold strategy), while an actively managed
funds will supposedly follow an original idea designed to outperform a referential benchmark
or the overall market. The underlying motivations behind investing in a passive strategies
are that it is cheaper (no fees linked to managerial skill, high turnover or screening and
monitoring) and less complex (it simply tracks a well defined market index). However, the
potential returns are low as a passive fund will never outperform the benchmark it tracks
and the funds’ managers are bound by the index, and as such have no investment flexibility.
On the other hand, active strategies can be attractive as they are designed to beat their
benchmark, and thus offer more potential returns. Moreover, they provide a greater flexibility
to the managers given that they are not limited to an index. Yet, the potential downfalls in
returns are greater than with index strategies (riskier) and the costs of operating are usually
much greater which may eclipse the added value generated by a manager. In recent years,
new managerial styles arose, some trying to blur the frontier between active and passive
2Given the difficulty and cost of gathering and consolidating data from portfolio holdings, we argue that
this methodology is better suited to institutional investors
3As such these assets are not part of their balance sheets
4They are no guarantee that any investment amount will be recovered, in other words managers do not
back-stop investment losses.
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management, others trying to incorporate ethical criteria into the investment decisions. For
instance, smart beta funds aim to beat a referential benchmark by variating the weights of its
underlying components, thus passively tracking the index (as no changes in compositions is
operated) while actively choosing the optimal weights for each positions. Socially responsible
investment (SRI) funds on the other hands, aim to uphold the values of sustainable finance,
notably by evaluating investment opportunities alongside three axes, environmental, social
& governance (ESG) and as such go beyond the traditional paradigm of risk vs returns.
Moreover, the industry’s diversity was even further exacerbated by recent changes witnessed
in its structure and size. Indeed, the global asset management has grown by approximately
140% between 2002 to 2017, going from managing approximately $32 trillion (BCG 2010) to
more than $77 trillion5 (BCG 2019), from which $68 trillion are managed by mutual funds and
$9 trillion by alternative funds such as hedge and private funds. More strikingly, that growth
was partly lead by the rise in popularity of passive strategies, notably by the introduction of
a new type of fund: the exchange traded funds (ETFs). ETFs are index funds which have
the particularity to be publicly offered on stock exchanges, these funds have been attracting
substantial interests in the market during the last decade as they grew from approximately
managing $417 billion in 2005 to $4.4 trillion by the end of 2017 (EY 2017). This rise in
popularity of passive strategies has effectively changed the structure of the market as it went
from representing 9% ($3 tn) of all AuM in 2003 to more than 19%($14 tn) in 2017, while
active management went from 82% ($26 tn) to 75% (50 tn) BCG (2019). This is quite a
significant shift as active management was once the only available option for investor willing
to delegate their wealth management Cremers, Fulkerson & Riley (2019). Indeed, passive
management is a relatively newer option6 introduced by the first ever index tracking funds:
the Vanguard 500 in late 1976 Morningstar (2011). As stated above, the management fees
of such funds are usually much lower than their active counterparts, their growth has thus
increased the competitive pressure on active funds, and compelled them to lower their fees in
order to remain attractive. According to Cremers et al. (2019), it went from 1.06% in 2000
to 0.78% in 2017.
Mutual Funds Performance: From Jensen To Carhart
From an academic point of view, the sheer size of the current active asset management
industry remains puzzling. Indeed, over the last 50 years of research —since Jensen (1969)
5As a comparison the banking and insurance industries represented $124 (Deloitte 2019) and $32.8 (FSB
2019) tn respectively at the same period.
6Although the concept of market portfolio was already promoted by both academics and practitioners
for years before Morningstar (2011)
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seminal work on mutual-funds performance— the general consensus in the literature points
to the average inability of active managers to cover their costs and persistently create value
for their investors, therefore finding no evidence of persistent managerial skills7. Management
skills has undoubtedly been one — if not the most— topical subject in the financial literature.
The vast majority of studies defines skills as the ability to create after fees abnormal returns
(i.e in excess of a referential benchmark), which is traditionally referred to as the “net alpha”.
Computing such net alpha sprung the creation of several factor models aiming to best evaluate
the actual abnormal performance generated by each manager. The first model, devised by
Jensen (1968), is a single-factor models based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) & Treynor (1961). The model measures the
performance of a portfolio with respect to the one predicted by the CAPM, as such it can be
understood as the portfolio excess-return with respect to a referential benchmark (the world
portfolio or SP500 for instance). Unfortunately, this model suffers from the same limitations
as the CAPM, which are the very strong assumptions on which it builds. For instance the
CAPM assumes full market efficiency and rationality from the market participants. In order
words, it assumes that their is no information asymmetry in the market, that prices reflect
at every moment all information available, and that investors based on these information will
make the most optimal choice possible. As such, it falls prey to the joint testing hypothesis
problem. The first hypothesis, when testing for abnormal returns, is that the CAPM is
correctly specified, the second that market are fully efficient. Therefore, when abnormal
returns are observed it is impossible to know whether the fund actually managed to generate
abnormal returns due to its manager’s skills or if it is due to market inefficiencies which
the models does not control for (i.e the model is incorrectly specified). Indeed, long lived
market inefficiencies have been documented in the literature, compromising the reliability
of the CAPM results, given that if agent were truly rational and had access to the same
information, they would try to take advantage of such price anomalies which would ultimately
cancel them out. One of the first anomaly detailed in the literature (see, Banz 1981) was
the historical outperformance of small capitalisation with regards to large ones, labelled the
size premium. An other anomaly pertains to the historical outperformance of value stocks
with regards to growth stocks8. The literature as used multiple ratios to segregate growth
from value stocks and asses their relative performance, with notably the price earning ratio
(PER) used by Basu (1977) or the price-to-book (P/B) ratio used by Fama & French (1993).
These observations led Fama & French (1993) to introduce a multi-factor model building on
7The most notable studies include: Sharpe (1991), Fama & French (1993), Carhart (1997),Fama & French
(2010)
8Value stocks are those considered to be traded under their fundamental value while growth stocks are
those traded above
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the same premise as the CAPM, yet attempting to take into account these specific market
anomalies which could explain performance and be mistaken as signs of managerial skills.
They authors introduced the 3 factor model which not only takes into account the market
premium (RMRF) but also the historic outperformance of value stocks with regards to growth
stocks (HML) and of small stocks with respect to large stocks (SMB), to assess the managerial
skills and thus try to mitigate the joint testing hypothesis by consolidating the model. Then,
building on Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) which observed that past winner (looser) stocks
tended to follow short term upward (downward) trend in their performance9 Carhart (1997)
added a fourth factor to the former model to control for momentum (MOM), thus creating
the four factor model. These models have enjoyed an incredible popularity in the financial
literature given that they are now what seems to be the de facto choice to measure the
performance of financial instruments (in the equity market). Other models have also gained
popularity10 over the years, with notably Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman & Wermers (1997a)
which introduced an alternative to factor model by developing a holding based measure of
performance that creates a benchmark based on the fund’s portfolio constituents and then
evaluates the difference in returns between the funds and its artificial benchmark, or Hoberg,
Kumar & Prabhala (2017) which introduced a measure of funds performance in excess of
their peers.
Active Management Versus Passive Management: The Debate Goes
On
As described before, the industry as evolved and conclusions drawn by seminal studies may
not hold in the current setting. This is notably highlighted by numerous recent academic
studies finding new evidence against the general consensus, and pointing to the ability of
some skilled managers to create value for their investors (see Cremers et al. 2019 for a re-
view). Studies regarding portfolio concentration (see for instance Kacperczyk, Sialm & Zheng
2005, Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Amihud & Goyenko 2013, Choi, Fedenia, Skiba & Sokolyk
2017) find evidence that managers concentrating their assets where they have informational
advantages are able to generate positive abnormal returns, thus showing signs of persistent
managerial skills. Others studies such as Sun, Wang & Zheng (2012), Vozlyublennaia & Wu
(2017) and Hoberg et al. (2017) find that in general funds implementing strategies deviating
from their peers tends to out-perform them. Thus, the debate regarding managerial skills and
how investors could distinguish it is still very much alive. Moreover, to this day a massive gap
9Therefore that strategies buying past winner stocks and selling past looser stocks had historically out-
perform the market.
10Although not as much as the ones of Fama & French (1993) nor Carhart (1997)
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in the literature concerning funds performance remains. Indeed, the vast majority of studies
on the asset management are conducted using US data and draw conclusions supposedly
translatable to all markets. This is problematic given the fact that the European Union is
the second biggest market worldwide regarding asset management11, yet more importantly
that it does not have the same characteristics as its US counterpart. For instance, in what
to this date represents the most comprehensive study on the asset management industry,
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel & Ramos (2013) found evidence that the diseconomies of scale,
largely documented for US funds, were not observed in the EU market where the author
found actual evidence of economies of scale12. The overall structure of the market is also
quite different as the EU implemented general laws encompassing the asset management in-
dustry for all member states (UCITS V13 for instance), but let each member the liberty to
implement specific fiscal laws which could foster the domiciliation of certain types of funds14.
Thus, As noted by Banegas, Gillen, Timmermann & Wermers (2013), improving our under-
standing of European funds and their strategies is critical for a large set of actors including
investors, regulators, and policymakers.
Structure Of The Thesis
As detailed before, the thesis is divided into three paper-based chapters revolving around a
common aim which is to provide investors (be them individual or institutional) with tools to
identifies successful strategies from active managers.
Chapter 1 is entitled “Making a difference: European mutual funds distinctiveness and
peers’ performance” and was written under the joint supervision of Prof. Sophie Béreau
and Prof. Jean-Yves Gnabo, my PhD supervisor. In this study, the sample consist of 4,957
funds over the 1999-2016 period. The most comparable databases are used by Banegas et al.
(2013) and Graef, Vogt, Vonhoff & Weigert (2018), who also cover the European segment
of the mutual funds industry. The former uses 4,200 funds from 1988 to 2008 at a monthly
frequency while the later focuses on 1,464 European funds from 2001 to 2017 at a semi-
annual frequency. We can further add to these studies the research by Ferreira et al. (2013),
which provides a worldwide analysis of mutual funds with 4,438 European funds out of the
11The EU market represented 37% of the global asset management industry by the end of 2016, while the
US accounted for 51% (EFAMA 2017)
12This is notably explained by the fact that on average EU funds are much smaller than their US coun-
terpart.
13https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0091&from=FR
14Luxembourg for instance is the highest hub worldwide of global and international funds Lang & Köhler
(2011), because of its attractive fiscal laws EY (2020)
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12,577 considered between 1997 to 2007. Given that our dataset is more extensive and span
on a longer time horizon we argue that we provide additional insights into the European
equity mutual funds industry. More specifically, in this chapter we evaluate if “distinctive”
strategies allow funds to outperform their peers and test this hypothesis in different mar-
ket conditions. Our main intuition is that funds’ competition primarily takes place within
styles (e.g., Eurozone Large-Cap, France equity). Yet, that given the broad definition of
these styles, it leaves funds with the possibility to implement innovative strategies in order
to “stand-out from the crowd” (Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017) and outperform their closest
competitors. This study principally builds on the ones of Brown & Goetzmann (1997) and
Sun et al. (2012) which find that funds which correlate less with their core category tend
to outperform. However, we depart from those studies in the way we uncover each fund’s
peers and compute their relative performance. To do so, we rely on the adaptive forgetting
factor for evolutionary clustering and tracking (AFFECT) cluster algorithm devised by Xu,
Kliger & Hero Iii (2014). Its advantages are twofold, (i) it allows to retrieve the funds peers
endogenously through time, thereby addressing changes in the number of styles, funds po-
tential shifts in style, and the entry and exit of funds, and (ii) it does so by only relying
on market data, thus avoiding to use portfolios holdings ones which can be tedious to ob-
tain and consolidate. Equipped with our endogenous categories, we first apply the strategy
distinctiveness index (SDI) devised by Sun et al. (2012), which measures the strength with
which a fund distinguish itself from its style. Secondly, we compute the relative performance
of funds with respect to their peers by relying on the out-performance ratio from Ardia &
Boudt (2018), which takes care of the “false discovery” issue detailed by Barras, Scaillet &
Wermers (2010). Our main results highlight a strong, robust, and positive impact of strategy
distinctiveness on financial performance. Yet, the effect is non-linear as its impact decreases
as a fund becomes too distinct.
I have presented this chapter at multiple national and international conferences and seminars.
Notably, the 22nd International Conference on Macroeconomic analysis and International Fi-
nance (ICMAIF) at the University of Cretes (2018) , the Belgium Financial Research Forum
at the National Bank of Belgium (2018), the 17th “Journée de l’économétrie” in Paris Nanterre
(2018), and the Vrij Universiteit brussels (VuB) and IESEG School of Management (Lille)
internal seminars (2018 and 2019 respectively). Finally, in September 2019, this chapter was
accepted for publication in the international peer-reviewed journal “Finance”. Finance is
ranked 2 in the CNRS categorization of Journals in Economics and Management.
Chapter 2 is entitled “Portfolio concentration and financial performance: insights from
domestic and global equity mutual funds” and was written under the supervision of Prof.
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Jean-Yves Gnabo. In this paper, we use information on portfolio holdings and the sample is
made of 1,746 funds over the 2003Q1 to 2016Q4 period. To the best of our knowledge this
is one of the most extensive and comprehensive database considering the portfolio holdings
of European equity mutual funds. Indeed, information on holdings is not easy to access and
is difficult to consolidate. Funds holdings are not publicly available at any time as they are
a testament of one’s strategy, however funds have — by law — to disclose their holdings
twice a years (in some countries 4 times a year), then data provider are able to collect and
store such disclosures (of potentially thousands of funds) for their clients to have access to.
Yet, a single fund in its lifetime may have invested in several thousands positions on which
information should be retrieved and consolidated in order to conduct the study. Hence,
this motivated the use of Morningstar Direct throughout this thesis, given its comprehensive
coverage across countries for funds and securities, as well as the availability of information re-
garding the funds’ complete historical portfolio holdings. Closest studies in terms of dataset
are the ones of Graef, Vogt, Vonhoff & Weigert (2019) and Franck & Kerl (2013). The former
consider 1464 European funds with portfolio holdings at a quarterly frequency over the 2001-
2017 period, the later collected portfolio holdings for 4315 European funds yet restricted their
sample to the 20005-2009 period at a semiannual frequency. The main motivation behind
this study pertains to recent literature developments pointing to the ability of concentrated
funds to significantly outperform their benchmark (Brands, Brown & Gallagher 2005, Cre-
mers & Petajisto 2009) and — in some cases— the market (Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Amihud
& Goyenko 2013, Choi et al. 2017). Therefore, in this chapter, we evaluate if concentrated
strategies are indeed reflective of higher managerial skills and enable to reap positive risk-
adjusted returns. We build on Cremers & Petajisto (2009) and define concentration along
two axes: stock selection (overweighting of core positions ) and risk factor exposures (effective
number of risk factor bets). We propose to do so by addressing several caveats traditionally
overlooked by the literature. The first caveat concerns measures of concentration defined
against a referential benchmark15, as these measures are by design extremely sensitive to
the chosen benchmark. As demonstrated by Amihud & Goyenko (2013), if a fund invests in
multiple styles, concentration estimations retrieved from benchmark-centric measures may
be misleading.
The second caveat relates to the definition of the risk factors themselves. Indeed, the vast
majority of studies are based on US funds with domestic strategies and as such rely on
“trivial” economic-based US factors such as industry factors (Kacperczyk et al. 2005) or
style factors16 (Amihud & Goyenko 2013). However, when considering funds with highly
15Such as in Cremers & Petajisto (2009)
16Small cap premium (SMB), value premium (HML), momentum premium (MOM)
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heterogeneous strategies (e.g., global, international or domestic funds) — such as the case in
Europe— their potential number becomes very large. Therefore, the literature on interna-
tional finance proposes to group the factors into different factor models: country, industry
and style17. Yet, it overlooks the possibility that factors from different models may proxy the
same underlying risk (Lessard 1974, Huij & Derwall 2011) and therefore may lead to under-
state the actual risk concentration of mutual funds. To circumvent this issue, we propose to
rely on a recent development of the risk budgeting literature which uses principal component
analysis (PCA) to uncover endogenous and uncorrelated risk factors directly from the assets
composing the portfolio. Then, we compute the effective number of factors to which each
fund is exposed to, in order to evaluate the breadth of the underlying strategy (Grinold &
Kahn 2000). Our intuition is that managers may focus their strategy on segments of the
market in which they have some expertise, or conversely manage their risk exposures by
actively spreading it through multiple factors. Relying exclusively on portfolio holdings data
to compute the stocks concentration and risk factor exposures allows to avoids entirely the
two aforementioned shortcomings.
Finally, crossing our two measures, we highlight that managers able to concentrate their
holdings in few core positions, while still spreading their risk exposures through multiple risk
factors, generate positive risk-adjusted returns and outperform their competitors, even in
time of financial turmoil.
I presented this paper at the 23rd ICMAIF at the university of Crete (2019), as well as at
internal seminars at the University of Namur (2019).
Chapter 3 is entitled “SRI mutual funds’ performance and investment universe” and was
written under the supervision of Prof. Jean-Yves Gnabo. This study tackles the topical
issue of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds’ performance. Given that the literature
on sustainable funds is more recent, and our wish to ground our study on existing ones to
offer a different point of view on what one could expect from their performance, we decided
to focus on US funds. Our dataset is made of 2,039 US portfolio for which holdings informa-
tion as well as the funds’ sustainability score are retrieved from 2002Q3 to 2018Q418. SRIs
managers aim to maximize financial returns, while constraining their investments to firms
deemed as socially responsible, thus superimposing an ethical consideration to portfolio se-
lection. According to traditional portfolio theory, such a constraint will mechanically worsen
portfolio diversification —as it decreases a fund’s number of eligible assets—, thus impact-
ing its efficiency (e.g., Markowitz 1952, Barnett & Salomon 2006, Renneboog, Ter Horst &
17See Huij & Derwall (2011) for a review on the subject
18the closest study to ours from El Ghoul & Karoui (2017), is made up of 2,168 funds at a yearly frequency
from 2003 to 2015
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Zhang 2008b). We challenge this narrative based on the fact that most managers already
operate on a restricted list of assets determined by their style(s) or reference benchmark(s).
Therefore, we argue that the potential negative impact on performance induced by an SRI
strategy19 may be alleviated by following a style (or multiple ones) giving access to numerous
investment opportunities (large investment universe).
To test our hypothesis, we propose a novel measure of a fund’ investment universe size (IU
Score). To do so, we use Morningstar styles (e.g., Large-cap value, Small-cap blend) and their
associated benchmark’s holdings, which effectively reflect the entire US equity market. Then,
using a portfolio overlap measure20 —based on the Manhattan distance— we compute the
similarity of each fund’s portfolio to all available benchmarks. At each period, we measure
the fund’s IU Score as the total number of stocks held by the associated styles’ benchmark
scaled by the magnitude of their overlap with the focal fund. Finally, we cross Morningstar’s
Sustainability Score — which measures the SRI strength of each fund— with the IU Score to
test whether SRI funds associated with larger universes fare better than their counterparts
associated with smaller universes. Furthermore, we also test for their performance relative
to more conventional funds associated with either large or small universes. Our main results
highlight that there is no significant difference between SRI funds and conventional funds’
performance level. However, when their performance is evaluated conditionally to their in-
vestment universe, we show that SRI mutual funds with the smallest universes consistently
under-perform other funds in the market. We conclude that styles selection is critical for SRI
managers in order to minimize the potential negative side effect of restrictions imposed by
their ethical goals.
The paper is currently in submission for the 24th ICMAIF at the university of Crete, and
to the 3rd annual conference of the Global Research Alliance for Sustainable Finance and
Investment (GRASFI) at the University of Columbia (NY).
19See Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang (2008a), El Ghoul & Karoui (2017)
20Inspired by Cremers & Petajisto (2009) Active Share measure
Chapter 1
Making a Difference: European Mutual Funds
Distinctiveness and Peers’ Performance
1.1 Introduction
Whether an investment fund can consistently outperform its competitors is still highly
debated in the academic literature. In their chase for higher “alpha”, funds considered
to be endowed with sufficient skills can decide to stand out “from the crowd”—to quote
Vozlyublennaia & Wu (2017)—by developing distinct strategies. Meanwhile, others limit
themselves to following the average behavior of their peers’ competitors.
The main issue we explore in this study is whether it is worth differentiating oneself from
one’s peers in the mutual funds industry. We do so by addressing the two following ques-
tions: Do distinctive strategies enable a fund to outperform its peer competitors and what
are the key drivers of distinctive strategies? Both questions are empirically examined with
care in the poorly documented context of the European mutual funds industry. Our main
findings are as follows. First, we demonstrate that European equity mutual funds (EEMFs)
generate on average higher risk-adjusted performance than their close competitors when they
follow “distinctive” strategies; however, this effect is non-linear. Hence, the marginal effect
tends to decrease with the level of distinctiveness. In addition, consistent with the notion
of “migration risk”, we show that the transition toward more distinctive strategies can be
costly, as a fast shift is associated with lower returns. Second, looking at the underlying
motivations, we find that most distinct funds are young and small.
Béreau, S., Gnabo, J. Y., Vanhomwegen, H. (2020). Making a difference: European mutual funds
distinctiveness and peers’ performance. Finance, 41 (2), 7-51
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These results provide new empirical evidence on funds’ performance, adding to an already
rich literature (see as general reference Ferreira et al. 2013 and the work by Sun et al. 2012
and Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017 on style, distinctiveness, and fund performance). Specifi-
cally, we contribute to the line of research testing the ability of particularly “skilled” funds
that implement innovative strategies to beat their competitors. The rationale behind this
test can be summarized as follows. Competition among funds exists primarily within styles
(e.g., Eurozone Large-Cap Equity or France Large-Cap Equity), with funds developing in-
vestment strategies to outperform their style peers (Hoberg et al. 2017). As these styles
are only broadly defined, they leave funds with sufficient latitude to differentiate themselves
from direct competitors—other funds following the same style—to generate higher gains (see
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman & Wermers 1997b; Sun et al. 2012; and more recently Hoberg et al.
2017). Whether such an objective is achieved in practice in the asset management industry
remains, however, an open question that academic research can help answer.
This question requires addressing several empirical caveats. Most notably, we need to identify
the set of relevant competitors (i.e., funds following the same style) with which each fund
should be compared and determine a methodology to confront their respective performance.
The first caveat stems from the lack of reliable information about fund style. As discussed
by Sensoy (2009), for instance, self-reported styles are subject to strategic manipulation by
investment funds (see also Hoberg et al. 2017), which casts doubt on their accuracy. To
circumvent this issue, the literature proposes applying statistical tools to retrieve the set
of institutions following the same style from the dependence between funds’ characteristics
such as returns on total net assets (TNA) (see Brown & Goetzmann 1997, Sun et al. 2012).1
Another caveat concerns the procedure used to compare funds’ performance with its com-
petitors. Because typical “absolute” indicators of risk-adjusted performance such as three-
and four-factor alphas are estimated quantities, they are not directly comparable across funds
and require specific econometric treatment to account for sampling errors (Ardia & Boudt
2018). For instance, two funds can display different estimated alphas, but such a difference
could be too small for the true unobserved alphas to be actually deemed as different. As
subsequently described, each of these problems is far from trivial and needs to be addressed
carefully to draw sound conclusions. In this study, we apply recent econometric methods as
well as machine learning-type approaches to address these issues. In particular, we apply an
endogenous dynamic clustering approach, the Adaptive Forgetting Factor for Evolutionary
Clustering and Tracking (AFFECT) methodology proposed by Xu et al. 2014, to retrieve the
number of styles in each period and allocate each fund to its style. We then compute the
1An alternative approach adopted by Cremers & Petajisto (2009) among others consists of using the
similarity of portfolio holdings.
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strategy distinctiveness index (SDI) of Sun et al. (2012). This metric enables us to set the
distance between each fund and its style peers. Next, we implement the peer performance
test developed by Ardia & Boudt (2018), which is immune to the so-called “false discovery”
problem (see Barras et al. 2010) to assess the proportion of competitors beaten by a spe-
cific fund. Finally, we use panel regression analyses to both test the impact of the SDI on
peer performance and reveal the determinants of the SDI. For the sake of comparison, we
also propose alternative approaches for estimating our relationships of interest, including,
for instance, either a specification with the original four-factor alpha (Carhart 1997) as a
dependent variable to measure mutual fund performance or a specification with variables
based on a clustering method applied to fixed length rolling windows as in Sun et al. (2012).
Another obstacle to overcome in this research is accessing comprehensive data on European
mutual funds. As noted above, compared with the U.S. mutual funds industry, the European
market has been poorly described so far despite substantial growth over recent decades. To
conduct the analysis, we thus collated a novel database comprising 4,957 EEMFs and to-
talling e1,014 trillion of capital under management by the end of 2016.
The closest study to ours is that of Sun et al. (2012). We build and extend their initial analy-
sis in a number of ways. First, we focus on the mutual funds industry as opposed to the hedge
funds industry in the reference study. The literature on the hedge funds and mutual funds in-
dustries has grown hand-in-hand over several decades, with contributions exploring separate
as well as common issues. While hedge funds have long been considered to be far riskier and
more aggressive than mutual funds, the growing risk taking in the mutual funds industry,
as reported by Choi et al. (2017), makes the assessment of their strategy along with their
resulting performance increasingly important. Second, we use data on European domiciled
funds as opposed to U.S. domiciled funds in Sun et al. (2012). The mutual funds industry has
been substantially growing outside the United States, with Europe being responsible for a
large part of this growth. For example, between 1999 and 2016, the EEMF market expanded
by more than 400% ($722 billion to $4.1 trillion) compared with 200% over the same period
for the United States (ICI 2017). In total, the size of the EEMF market reached e3.8 trillion
of assets under management (AUM) in 2016, representing 37% of that of the U.S. equity
mutual fund industry and 23% of the global equity mutual fund industry (EFAMA 2017).
Importantly, Ferreira et al. (2013) note—in their cross-country analysis of mutual funds—
substantial differences in the determinants of fund performance in the United States and
elsewhere in the world, casting doubt on whether U.S.-based findings can be extrapolated to
other markets. They show, for instance, that the well-known relationship between fund size
and performance differs markedly when comparing U.S. with non-U.S. domiciled funds. As
noted by Banegas et al. (2013), improving our understanding of EEMFs, their environment,
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and their strategy is thus critical for a large set of actors including investors, regulators, and
policymakers. To the best of our knowledge, evidence on the link between strategy distinc-
tiveness and financial performance for European institutions is lacking. Third, we propose
a modified version of Sun et al. (2012)’s procedure to compute the SDI. Such a procedure
is based on a fully dynamic and endogenous clustering approach (hereafter referred to as an
adaptive approach) as opposed to a simple rolling window approach (non-adaptive approach)
in its original form. As discussed in Section 3, style identification is a central ingredient in the
measure of strategy distinctiveness. Our approach should therefore provide a more accurate
measure. Fourth, we adopt a more consistent approach to measuring funds’ performance.
Sun et al. (2012) define the competitive environment of each fund as the set of funds fol-
lowing the same style. Their strategy distinctiveness measure is consistently computed with
respect to this specific set of competitors. However, in their analysis, a fund’s performance is
based on a risk-adjusted alpha, supposing implicitly that each fund competes with the whole
universe of funds. In the spirit of Cohen, Coval & Pástor (2005) and other contributions on
“peer alpha” (Hunter, Kandel, Kandel & Wermers 2014), we measure the fund’s performance
as a fund’s risk-adjusted returns relative to the risk-adjusted returns of its competitors (i.e.,
funds belonging to the same style). Then, we rely on statistical tests in our comparison to
control for sampling noise.2 Fifth, we explore the existence of non-linearity in the relation-
ship between strategy distinctiveness and financial performance to assess the existence of
an optimal distance or a transition cost when shifting toward an innovative strategy due to
migration risk.3
Overall, our work provides new empirical evidence on mutual funds and the role of distinctive
strategies. Our results support the existence of a strong and positive link between strategy
distinctiveness and relative performance measured by the percentage of peers outperformed.
This finding is robust to a series of sensitivity tests, including the use of traditional four-factor
alpha to measure absolute performance. In this case, our findings mean that singular strate-
gies improve performance above both (style) peer competitors and the rest of the market.
Turning to the determinants of a fund’s distinctiveness, fund age, volatility, and TNA values
are found to be negative drivers of strategy distinctiveness. These results confirm previous
results found for other segments of the asset management industry and other markets. In
particular, our results are consistent with those of Sun et al. (2012) and Vozlyublennaia &
Wu (2017), who, with the exception of age for the latter, find the same type of relationship
2For comparison purposes, we also provide regressions with the traditional four-factor model Carhart
(1997) to measure risk-adjusted performance.
3Migration risk stems from the lack of knowledge or expertise of fund managers when they start imple-
menting new strategies. It is usually associated with changes in style. However, this principle can arguably
be extended to changes occurring within a style, as studied in our analysis when a fund shifts to more singular
and innovative strategies.
1.2. DATA 5
between the aforementioned fund characteristics and strategy distinctiveness for U.S. hedge
funds and U.S. mutual funds, respectively. We also unveil new features such as the impact of
cluster-related characteristics on future performance. The results of the non-linear specifica-
tions provide interesting nuances for the analysis. Specifically, we highlight (i) the stronger
effect of strategy distinctiveness on financial outperformance during the crisis period, (ii)
the lower performance when the shift toward more innovative strategies is fast, and (iii) the
existence of a tipping point beyond which the positive marginal effect of the strategy distinc-
tiveness variable dies out. As a result, although following innovative strategies pays off on
average, the effect is non-linear and exhibits a threshold level over which being too different
becomes useless.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our data. In
Section 3, we describe our methodology used to dynamically assess funds’ clusters, which
then allows us to measure funds’ distinctiveness among their peers and quantify how this
characteristic affects performance and other aggregates over time. In Section 4, we review
the EEMF industry and present the results from the regression analyses. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
1.2 Data
We create an original database on EEMFs. To that aim, we take advantage of micro-
level data (i.e., fund-level information) on equity mutual funds domiciled in a broad range of
European countries. The EEMF data are extracted from the Morningstar Direct database.
Morningstar is widely used in the asset management literature (see Sensoy 2009, Patel &
Sarkissian 2017). Among the key advantages of the Morningstar Direct database are its
comprehensive coverage across countries and over time as well as the presence of non-surviving
and surviving funds, making it free from survivorship bias. Information on fund attributes
is available at various frequencies. For the present study, we collect daily prices along with
returns4 and TNA values, both at a monthly frequency. We also retrieve several other fund
characteristics such as fund age and flows (see Table 1.1 for the details).
4Morningstar does not adjust total returns for sales charges or redemption fees. However, the data
account for management, administrative, and 12b-1 fees as well as other costs automatically deducted from
fund assets.
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Table 1.1: Variables of interest (1999-2016)
Variables Frequency Units Sources
Return Monthly % Morningstar
Price Daily Euro Morningstar
TNA Monthly Billion Euro Morningstar
Age Monthly Years Morningstar
Flow Monthly Billion Euro Morningstar
Assigned benchmark Point Morningstar
Vstocxx Monthly Macrobond
Note: Table 1.1 reports the original data frequency, unit and sources for our main variables of interest.
We recover 8,520 equity mutual funds for 1999–2016. Then, we apply successive filters
consistent with the literature (Sun et al. 2012, Ferreira et al. 2013). For instance, we exclude
funds with fewer than 10 observations and less than e10 million in AUM. We further exclude
funds of funds, index tracking funds, and funds not traded in euros. In addition, styles
representing less than 1% of the population of funds and associated funds are excluded. We
end up with 4,957 funds dispatched into 22 distinct styles, as identified by Morningstar (see
Table 1.2).
The TNA (∼ e1 trillion) of selected funds by the end of 2016 amounted to almost 40% of
our target industry (EFAMA 2017, Morningstar 2016). Table 1.3 lists the European countries
and their corresponding populations of funds.
Compared with the existing literature, the strength of our database is threefold. First, it
covers a large number of funds. As a point of comparison, the aforementioned studies of Sun
et al. (2012) and Vozlyublennaia & Wu (2017) that include the determinants of investment
fund performance in the U.S. market rely on 3,896 and 3,519 funds, respectively. Second,
information is available at a relatively high frequency, with the key attributes observed every
month. Third, we embrace nearly two decades of European data that cover both crisis and
post-crisis periods. To the best of our knowledge, the most comparable databases are used
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Table 1.2: Benchmark and styles (December 2016)
Styles Benchmarks # of funds ebillion
Europe Small-Cap Equity MSCI Europe Small Cap NR EUR 82 17.47 e
Asia-Pacific incl Japan Equity MSCI AC Asia Pacific NR USD 60 9.14 e
Sector Equity Consumer Goods & Services Cat 50%MSCI Wld/CD NR&50%MSCI Wld/CS NR 46 14.15 e
Global Emerging Markets Equity MSCI EM NR USD 228 114.55 e
Europe Large-Cap Value Equity MSCI Europe Value NR EUR 89 26.34 e
Global Large-Cap Blend Equity MSCI World NR USD 631 188.32 e
US Large-Cap Blend Equity Russell 1000 TR USD 146 58.65 e
Europe Large-Cap Blend Equity MSCI Europe NR EUR 519 160.65 e
Asia ex Japan Equity MSCI AC Asia Ex Japan NR USD 84 29.79 e
US Large-Cap Growth Equity Russell 1000 Growth TR USD 58 36.15 e
Eurozone Large-Cap Equity MSCI EMU NR EUR 364 86.62 e
Global Large-Cap Growth Equity MSCI World Growth NR USD 107 49.56 e
Global Large-Cap Value Equity MSCI World Value NR USD 98 45.80 e
Europe Large-Cap Growth Equity MSCI Europe Growth NR EUR 65 33.24 e
Japan Large-Cap Equity Topix TR JPY 100 38.96 e
Sector Equity Technology MSCI World/Information Tech NR USD 48 12.60 e
Sector Equity Healthcare MSCI World/Health Care NR USD 57 19.05 e
France Large-Cap Equity Euronext Paris CAC 40 NR EUR 100 23.83 e
Asia-Pacific ex-Japan Equity MSCI AC Asia Pac Ex JPN NR USD 59 27.88 e
Emerging Europe Equity MSCI EM Europe NR EUR 42 5.37 e
Italy Equity MSCI Italy NR EUR 45 9.07 e
Spain Equity MSCI Spain NR EUR 69 6.95 e
Total 3097 1,014.13 e
Note: Table 1.2 lists the 22 styles identified by Morningstar Direct as well as their associated benchmark.
The last two columns report the number of funds (in 2016Q4) belonging to each style along with their
total net assets.
by Banegas et al. (2013) and Graef et al. (2018), who also cover the European segment of the
mutual funds industry. We can further add to these studies the research by Ferreira et al.
(2013), which provides a worldwide analysis of mutual funds. In their analysis, European
domiciled mutual funds account for 4,438 of the 12,577 mutual funds in total and observations
span from 1997 to 2007. Graef et al. (2018) include 1,464 European funds from 2001 to 2017
at a semi-annual frequency, whereas Banegas et al. (2013) use 4,200 funds from 1988 to 2008
at a monthly frequency. Therefore, we provide additional insights into the European equity
mutual funds industry.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical analysis aims to investigate the impact of EEMFs’ distinctiveness (relative
to peers) on future performance as well as its causes. To this end, we propose a modified
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Table 1.3: EEMFs Domiciles






























Note: Table 1.3 reports the number of funds per country (# of funds) as well as their % share with respect
to the total number of funds.
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version of the approach developed by Sun et al. (2012) that addresses several of the econo-
metric caveats associated with the data. In Section 3.1, we describe our empirical approach
to retrieve endogenous styles and compute fund-level strategy distinctiveness over time. In
Section 3.2, we present the regression setting.
1.3.1 SDI
To capture the degree of distinctiveness or, on the contrary, the degree of similarity
among EEMF investments at both the system-wide and the individual levels, we follow
the general setup proposed by Sun et al. (2012), which relies on a measure of the distance
between funds’ net asset returns. The underlying motivation for using such a proxy is simply
that we expect closer net asset returns for funds exhibiting similar portfolios, which reflect
a similar investment strategies. An alternative is to directly rely on information on the
portfolio holdings of funds (Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Gupta-Mukherjee 2013) and measure
the deviation from a passive benchmark. However, those data are not easily accessible5 and
net asset returns are available at a higher frequency, providing more flexibility to describe
the evolution of commonalities over time.
As previously noted, our main measure is constructed by following the setup developed by
Sun et al. (2012) to compute the SDI. In their work, the SDI assesses how distinct and unique
a fund strategy is relative to its peers. Formally, the SDI measure is calculated for each fund
i as follows:
SDIi,t = 1− corr(ri,t, µI,t)
= 1−
∑24









Thus, this metric corresponds to 1 minus the correlation between the fund’s returns (r i,t)
and the average returns of all funds in the same cluster or style indexed by I (µI,t). The
higher the SDI, the more distinct is the investment strategy of a fund with respect to its
5Working with portfolio holdings is generally costly because the data collection is long and taxing. It
also often limits the number of funds to be considered as well as the data frequency. For instance, Cremers &
Petajisto (2009), Gupta-Mukherjee (2013) include no more than 3000 mutual funds at a quarterly frequency.
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peers from the same cluster. To obtain a time-varying measure consistent with the monthly
frequency of our analysis, correlations are computed as realized correlations, namely within-
month correlations from daily returns in our case.6
One critical aspect of the methodology lies in the identification of fund styles. A fund’s
style governs the broad direction of the investment strategy (e.g., concentrating on a specific
region or class of assets). Within a style, funds can depart from their peers by making
decisions depending on their skills or innovativeness. Therefore, pairing funds according
to their style is a pivotal step in subsequently gauging the innovativeness of each strategy
relative to style-based peers. For fund managers, peer funds following a similar style are
particularly relevant for comparison purposes because they constitute their natural “rivals” or
“competitors”7, as stated by Hoberg et al. (2017) (see also DiBartolomeo & Witkowski 1997,
Brown & Goetzmann 1997). To allocate mutual funds into styles over time, we follow two
strategies that both infer the style directly from the data. First, we rely on a traditional rolling
window approach, which we refer to as “non-adaptive”. Second, we apply an “adaptive”
clustering method (Xu et al. 2014). In the forthcoming sections, we elaborate on both
approaches.
1.3.1.1 Non-adaptive cluster algorithm
Ample anecdotal evidence exists in the press and more formal evidence exists in the aca-
demic literature that self-reporting of style by funds—the so-called prospectus—can provide
a misleading picture of their actual style-based strategy. The simple reason is that a financial
institution may have a strategic interest in misreporting its style by announcing ex post to
have followed a style to mask poor performance under its true strategy (see Sensoy 2009,
Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Hoberg et al. 2017). In response, several studies have proposed
alternative approaches to endogenously retrieve style-based categories and the associated
fund allocations from data. The identification procedure builds on the intuition that funds
that are similar or close to each other should be placed in a common group, whereas those
appearing more distant should be in different groups. Each group then stands for the unob-
served underlying style. Equipped with distance measures for all pairs of funds, alternative
clustering techniques can be applied to allocate them into consistent groups. In practice, the
6Sun et al. (2012) apply rolling windows of 24 months over the entire sample. Our approach of using
within-month correlations avoids us making an arbitrary choice about the size of the rolling windows. It is
also more consistent with the monthly frequency used in the regression analysis.
7Hoberg et al. (2017) consider institution-specific competitors. As discussed in Section 1, we adopt a
more conventional definition of the set of competitors: all funds belonging to the same style are assumed to
be direct competitors. This approach has the advantage of being transitive. In other words, if fund A is a
rival to fund B and fund B a rival to fund C, then we assume that A and C are rivals, which is not guaranteed
under Hoberg et al. (2017)’s methodology.
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allocation of mutual funds into accurate similarity-based categories is challenging. Here, we
follow Brown & Goetzmann (1997, 2001) and Sun et al. (2012) to group our sets of funds
in a consistent manner by applying clustering algorithms on funds’ net asset returns. The
seminal approach on which we rely is the well-known “K-means” algorithm (Hartigan 1975),
which has a simple and intuitive rationale. Hence, considering a set of n observations and K
clusters specified ex ante8, the “K-means” algorithm aims to find a partition such that the
squared difference between the empirical mean of each cluster and the points in the cluster
is minimized. In other words, the observations are grouped into K clusters such that each
belongs to the group with which the associated mean exhibits the closest distance. The
process is traditionally iterative. First, the K observations of the dataset are assigned as
the initial cluster means. Second, observations are gathered according to their nearest mean,
which is computed as the smallest Euclidean distance.9 Then, the process iterates between
step one and step two until the results converge to a final segmentation of the data. An
important shortcoming of the previous algorithm concerns its static nature because it has
been designed to address non-dynamic systems. In some cases, however, we observe time
variations in both the composition and the number of clusters. The asset management in-
dustry is one such case. In essence, the industry evolves continuously over time given the
appearance and disappearance of funds and variations in styles due to changing market con-
ditions and perceived profitability. One way to address the time-varying nature of styles
and associated clusters is to implement static methods over rolling windows, as in Brown
& Goetzmann (1997, 2001) and Sun et al. (2012). As such, static clustering methods are
applied to successive subsamples of a fixed size. As explained further later, we refer to these
methods as “non-adaptive”. As discussed in the statistical literature (see Zivot & Wang
2006, Clark & McCracken 2009), such approaches suffer from various empirical problems. In
particular, the choice of the largely arbitrary bandwidth or window size constitutes a crucial
assumption that has been proven to significantly affect the results of studies using a fixed
window width. For instance, dividing long time series characterized by a time dependence
structure may artificially generate outliers that, in addition to the limited timespan of the
data within the windows, can severely bias the estimations. Overall, estimations performed
over rolling windows can thus provide a misleading picture of the system over time, which
calls for alternative approaches specifically designed to account for dynamic structures.
8In our empirical application, we define K as the number of existing styles, as identified by Morningstar.
9Alternative metrics have also been suggested as potential extensions, such as the Mahalanobis distance
(Mao & Jain 1996), the L1 distance (Kashima, Hu, Ray & Singh 2008), and the family of Bregman distances
(Banerjee, Dhillon, Ghosh, Merugu & Modha 2007), to quote only a few.
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1.3.1.2 Adaptive cluster algorithm
In recent years, alternative statistical clustering techniques have been developed in the ma-
chine learning literature to address temporal systems; see, for instance, Yang, Harris, Luo,
Xiong, Joachimiak, Wu, Dehal, Jacobsen, Yang, Palumbo et al. (2009), Xu et al. (2014) and
more recently Matias & Miele (2017). Here, we rely on the AFFECT algorithm specifically
designed to address dynamic clusters. Compared with the previous rolling window method-
ology, AFFECT allows us to control for the rate at which past proximities are forgotten in
an adaptive way. In other words, it allows the data to speak by estimating rather than arbi-
trarily fixing the optimal level of smoothing in each time step. Another advantage of relaxing
the requirement of arbitrary short sequences (24 months in our case) is the ability to directly
consider entries and exits in the market, which mitigates survivorship bias more effectively
than in the non-adaptive setting in which complete information is required. Moreover, AF-
FECT avoids data overlaps. Indeed, proximities in the adaptive setting are computed each
month using only within-month daily returns.
The AFFECT algorithm is iterative and proceeds in several structured steps. First, as an
initialization phase, it computes a matrix of proximities in t=1 to which is further applied
a standard static clustering method (e.g., K-means in our case). In our context, as the
initial proximity matrix, we use the dot product matrix of funds’ daily net return time series
normalized each month, which corresponds to a correlation matrix between the returns. Then,
the similarity matrices in each time step are obtained by revising past information thanks to
a state-space representation featuring a parameter, namely the “adaptive forgetting factor”,
which is a function of past similarity matrices. As such, this method assumes that the time-
varying observed matrix of proximities (Wt) can be modeled as a linear combination of a true
(latent) proximity matrix (Ψt) plus a zero-mean noise matrix Nt. Xu et al. (2014) propose
a smoothing estimation procedure of Ψt as an alternative to the standard Kalman filter
procedure. More specifically, this consists of a convex combination of the static estimation
Wt through static clustering techniques and the past smoothed proximity matrix (Ψ̂t−1):
Wt = Ψt +Nt
Ψ̂t = αtΨ̂t−1 + (1− αt)Wt
with Ψ̂0 = W0
(1.2)
αt controls the rate at which past proximities are forgotten and is thus referred to as the
“forgetting factor”. The forgetting factor’s identification is performed through a shrinkage
estimation thanks to a block-model representation (see for more details Xu et al. 2014). How-
ever, the true value of the α parameter is interpreted by the authors as the “oracle forgetting
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factor”, which requires perfect knowledge of the true proximity matrix (Ψt) as well as the
noise variance (Nt). Xu et al. (2014) propose an estimator based on the sample counterparts
of the theoretical moments on which it depends, which here are simply the sample mean
and variance of Wt. However, given that both Ψt and Nt are time varying, the authors
suggest using the spatial mean and variance. Finally, because the estimation requires full
unknown information about the block structure (cluster structure), it is performed adaptively
(in practice, up to three iterations are required to make the process converge).
1.3.1.3 Adaptive vs. non-adaptive cluster algorithms
Table 1.4 provides preliminary insights into the constitution of our clusters when applying
these adaptive and non-adaptive approaches. We describe the stability of the clusters by
computing two measures. Cluster stability depicts the similarity percentage of associated
funds in two consecutive periods. The statistic reaches 79% in the adaptive setting compared
with 75% in the non-adaptive one. Cluster switch corresponds to the percentage of funds
migrating from one cluster to another for at least two consecutive months. The results
show that funds switch styles 15.7% of the time under the adaptive approach and 19%
under the non-adaptive one. Overall, these figures are in line with those of Sun et al. (2012)
(16.6%) for U.S. hedge funds and Brown & Goetzmann (1997) (17.6%) for U.S. mutual funds.
Therefore, they are consistent with the idea that while funds typically follow one long-term
global strategy (i.e., their style), they can occasionally migrate to another style. We also
report information on our largest and smallest styles in terms of the population of funds.
Eventually, for the overlapping year, we cross-check our classification with that proposed by
Morningstar (Table 1.5). A similar exercise is conducted by Sun et al. (2012), who cross-
check their hedge fund classification with the one retrieved from Lipper TASS. Overall, the
classifications are consistent. Considering the best match (i.e., the highest number of funds
in each category that match with a specific style cluster), 57% of the funds grouped together
in Morningstar are still together under our clustering algorithm. If we take the cumulative
proportion of the two largest matches, we reach 76%.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 1.3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Equipped with these two procedures (adaptive and non-adaptive clustering), we can com-
pute SDI measures in the cluster of reference for each fund (i.e., the group of peers following
the same style) over time. Table 1.6 features the evolution over time (yearly basis) of the
computed SDI (monthly average over all funds) based on the adaptive K-means generated
from the AFFECT algorithm (column I) and from the non-adaptive K-means (column II).
As explained previously, the adaptive setting does not rely on rolling windows and incorpo-
rates directly available data on a monthly basis (reducing the loss of data compared with the
rolling window approach), thereby allowing us to better distinguish the dynamics of the SDI
over time. Yet, common patterns can be observed for both of them. There is a significant
increase in commonalities after the explosion of the dotcom bubble (2001–2003), followed by
a sharp decrease starting in 2004 and peaking in 2005. A second, more pronounced, rise in
commonalities occurs around the financial crisis (2006–2008) and is followed (in the adaptive
case) by a period of relatively high distinctiveness around 2009–2010. In the non-adaptive
case, the crisis impact is more persistent considering the level of smoothing imposed (24
months). In 2012–2013, the market exhibits higher average distinctiveness, immediately fol-
lowed by a short yet intense commonality rise during the Chinese financial crisis in late 2015.
This table illustrates one caveat of using a fixed window width, which tends to artificially
overstate critical periods (dotcom bubble, financial crisis) and understate smaller transitive
periods (2009–2010).
1.3.2 Regression analyses
We then use a panel regression analysis setting to shed light on the impact of the SDI on mu-
tual funds’ performance and identify its determinants. For the performance analysis, we use
both a benchmark model in which the SDI enters linearly and alternative non-linear models
to explore more complex relationships. In addition, two performance measures are com-
puted. In the spirit of Sun et al. (2012), we include our distinctiveness variable as a regressor
to explain one-step-ahead excess returns as measured by the traditional four-factor alpha.
Alternatively, and to ensure consistency with the principle of style-based competition—the
notion that funds mainly compete with funds following the same style—we depart from
Sun et al. (2012) and construct an auxiliary dependent variable. This variable depicts the
relative performance of the fund, namely its performance compared with that of its direct
competitors. Because its computation is less straightforward than that for standard excess
returns, we follow the testing procedure developed by Ardia & Boudt (2018), which allows
for a formal assessment of whether pairs of estimated alphas are statistically different from
one another and eventually for each fund, to compute the proportion of peers outperformed.
This measure is an adaptation of the well-known “false discovery rate” measure used by
1.3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 17




















Note: Table 1.6 reports the average funds’ SDI from 1999 to 2016. Column 2 reports the results in the
adaptive setting while Column 3 reports those in the non-adaptive setting.
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Barras et al. (2010) to analyze peers. Hence, our second performance measure provides the
proportion of competitors each fund outperforms. We further explore the link between the
SDI and financial performance by looking at the conditional effects. To this end, we include
interaction terms and test for a threshold effect by adding a quadratic term. Eventually,
in line with the notion of migration risk, we examine how costly the transition toward an
innovative strategy could be by including the variation of the SDI in the model.
In a last step, we further extend the analysis to explore the drivers of distinctiveness among
EEMFs. We do so by regressing our strategy distinctiveness measure on a set of individ-
ual characteristics as well as global factors. At the micro level, this final step describes the
various contexts that lead funds to diverge from “the crowd” (Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017).
At the macro level, our study relates to the literature on commonality in the asset manage-
ment industry (see Bussière, Hoerova & Klaus 2015; Béreau, Casteleyn, Gnabo & Zwinkels
2015) and sheds light on the determinants of the fragmentation and integration phases in the
EEMF industry. To that end, we regress our measure of distinctiveness on state-of-the-art
fund-specific determinants (see Sun et al. 2012) and cluster- and system wide-level drivers.
Table 1.7 defines our main variables. In Section 4.1, we discuss the specification of each
model further.
1.4 Results
In this section, we summarize the main characteristics of the EEMF market. Appendix A
describes the industry more in depth. The European market displays several traits that
provoke the interest of academic researchers. We recall them in the main lines (Table 1.8)
before presenting our findings. For instance, mean size (TNA), age, and the four-factor alpha
are e234.4 million, 9.5 years, and -0.81% (annually), respectively. These figures are close to
those reported by Ferreira et al. (2013) for EU countries10.
At a structural level, the EEMF market displays a unique combination of integration and
fragmentation features compared with the United States. Hence, the European market is
integrated, as countries typically apply the laws set by the European Parliament. Yet, the
interpretation and implementation of those laws can diverge across countries. Further, Eu-
ropean economies can experience different macroeconomic developments or levels of com-
petition, thereby offering contrasting environments to local mutual funds. Regarding fiscal
10Ferreira et al. (2013)’s estimates are $251.9 million, 10.6 years, and -0.39% (quarterly).
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Table 1.7: Control variables definitions
Fund specific variables
Fundsize Natural logarithm of a fund’s TNA in bn
Age Natural logarithm of a fund’s age in years
Flow Change in TNA not explained by the fund’s performance
Volatility* Std of within-month daily net returns
Cluster specific variables
Cluster-mean* Average returns of the funds belonging in each cluster
Cluster-size % of funds belonging in each cluster
Cluster-SDI* SDI of cluster with respect to the overall population of funds
Cluster-meancap Average size (in TNA) of funds belonging to the cluster
Note: Table 1.7 reports the definitions of our main fund and cluster characteristics.* indicates that the way
to compute the associated variables differ in the non-adaptive setting using 24 months of past returns
instead of within-month daily returns.
aspects, for instance, competitive tax laws in Ireland and Luxembourg foster the domiciliation
of funds (PWC 2018). At the fund level, some European features are also worth mentioning.
Typically, in most European countries, more than 50% of domestic EEMFs’ TNA are owned
by commercial banks compared with less than 20% in the United States (Ferreira, Matos
& Pires 2018) because of differences in legislation between both markets (i.e., the Glass–
Steagall Act of 1999 separating banking and asset management activities until 1999 in the
United States). Against this background, we aim in this analysis to empirically describe this
segment of the mutual funds market and unveil of some of its main features.
Turning to our results, at the macro level, our large database enables us to show that the
EEMF population experienced a strong expansion phase from 1999 to 2009 and then stabi-
lized until 2017. Cross-country comparisons exhibit marked heterogeneity in some periods.
On the one hand, the Italy and Spain data emphasize limited increases in the equity mutual
fund population during the first decade of the sample and a significant decline during and
after the European debt crisis. On the other hand, Luxembourg, France, and Germany (to
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Table 1.8: European mutual funds descriptive statistics
Fund descriptive statistics
Mean Median Standard deviation
Fundsize (eM) 234.48 66.91 663.46
Age (Years) 9.51 8.17 7.52
Flow (eM) -0.46 -0.03 34.81
Volatility 1.08 0.93 0.65
Alpha 4 Factor (Annualised %)* -0.81 0.09 0.22
Outperformance (%)* 9.5 0 21.52
SDI* 0.12 0.08 0.12
Note: Table 1.8 reports descriptive statistics concerning our main fund characteristics and perfor-
mance/distinctiveness measures using the adaptive setting.* Indicates that the way to compute the asso-
ciated variables differ in the non-adaptive setting using 24 months of past returns instead of within-month
daily returns.
some extent) display strong expansion phases until 2009 and resist well during the crisis,
whereas the Ireland data show growth in the country’s equity mutual fund industry after
2009. During the two decades, our findings emphasize periods of concentration from 2000 to
2003, from 2006 to 2011, and in 2015, marked by a lower number of styles and larger style-
based groups, along with periods of fragmentation from 2003 to 2006, from 2012 to 2014, and
in 2016 characterized by relatively few populated clusters. Overall, our analysis suggests the
existence of six key periods characterized by three attributes: level of concentration versus
fragmentation, persistence in cluster composition, and level of distinctiveness (see Table 1.9).
1.4.1 Performance analysis
Table 1.10 displays the estimates of the baseline equation that models the one-step-ahead
performance as a function of its SDI and a set of control variables. If the SDI mirrors
innovative and skillful managerial talents, we should expect its estimated coefficient to be
significant and positive. As described in Section 3, the set of regressors can be organized into
two categories: fund-specific and cluster-specific attributes. Column I on the left reports the
main results. The parameter estimates are obtained by applying the modified version of Sun
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Table 1.9: Overall Market trend
Periods Concentration levels Clusters persistence Innovation levels (Mean SDI)
1999 to 2001 Low Below Average High
2002 to 2004 Moderate Above average Low
2005 to 2007 Moderate Below Average High
2008 to 2011 Extreme Average Low
2012 to 2015 High Average High
2015 to 2016 Extreme Below Average Low
Note: Table 1.9 summarises the main characteristics of the European equity mutual funds across time.
Based on a qualitative analysis of Figures 6 to 9, we report the overall concentration of the market (in
terms of TNA, number and size of the clusters). Then using Figure 11, we report the persistence in cluster
composition (% of funds remaining in the same cluster). Finally, we display the average level of SDI as
reported in Table 1.6
et al. (2012)’s procedure11. From columns I to V, the results are retrieved using an adaptive
setting, namely AFFECT, and within-month daily returns (minimum 18 observations). In
column I, we apply GLM to estimate the coefficients. In column II, we apply traditional OLS
as an alternative. In column III, the autoregressive term is dropped from the specification.
In the literature (see Sun et al. 2012, Ferreira et al. 2013) the dynamic nature of the process
is traditionally ignored despite its strong significance, as shown by the results in column
I. Columns IV and V report the results using the more traditional absolute measure of
performance with the four-factor alpha12 (Carhart 1997). In the second part of the table
(columns VI and VII), we report the results for the non-adaptive setting. The difference from
the first set of results (columns I to V) lies in the setting used to recover the clusters and, in
turn, the performance measures and SDI. In column VII, we strictly follow the approach of
Sun et al. (2012). In column VI, we depart from the original approach by replacing the four-
factor alpha with the outperformance ratio. These additional models enable us to compare
the influence of the adaptive and non-adaptive approaches for our data.
11Specifically, our econometric approach departs from Sun et al. (2012) in four ways. First, the dependent
variable is measured by the level of outperformance, as provided by the testing procedure of Ardia & Boudt
(2018). Second, the SDI is computed using style-based clusters in an adaptive setting. For these clusters,
we apply the AFFECT algorithm. Third, to take care of the support space of the dependent variable that
displays the percentage of funds outperformed within the same cluster, we apply generalized linear model
(GLM) estimators. The GLM methodology is more efficient than traditional ordinary least squares (OLS)
for explaining bounded variables between 0 and 1 (see Papke & Wooldridge 1996). Fourth, we include an
autoregressive term to account for potential inertia.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Throughout the results, we report both the value of the coefficients and the robust t-statistics,
corrected for fund-level clustering, in parentheses13. In the lower part of the table, we include
the number of observations, number of funds, average observation per fund, pseudo R2, and
F-statistics to test whether all the regressors are jointly equal to zero. The pseudo R2 is
computed by following Verbeek (2008) as the correlation of the actual and predicted values
of the dependent variable.
We start the analysis with the main model. We find that the coefficient attached to the SDI
displays strong statistical significance because the p-value is below the 1% level when we con-
trol for the time fixed effect and adjust the t-statistics for fund-level clustered errors, along
with a large number of fund- and cluster-specific attributes. The sign of the coefficient is
positive, indicating that EEMFs following a distinctive strategy on average outperform their
close peers. Hence, a more singular strategy within styles tends to reflect management skills
for EEMFs14. Economically, the outperformance ratio is expected to increase by 14.31 basis
points after a one standard deviation increase in the SDI. Among the fund-specific attributes,
all but fund flows are found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. The signs of the
coefficients are in line with those of previous studies that explain financial excess returns. For
instance, the marginal effect of Fund size is negative. As discussed by Ferreira et al. (2013),
the sign can be explained by the scarcity of the best investment opportunities. As the fund
grows, marginal investments must be made in less performing assets, eroding the portfolio’s
overall performance (see Sun et al. 2012 for hedge funds and Berk & Green 2004, Chen,
Hong, Huang & Kubik 2004, Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017 for mutual funds). Another expla-
nation is the existence of the organizational diseconomies of scale attributable, for instance,
to the difficulty in processing soft information, or so-called hierarchy costs (see Stein 2002).
Likewise, the sign of Age is negative. EEMFs perform worse as they age. Put differently,
younger funds tend to outperform their older peers. This outcome can be explained by the
necessity for a fund that has been newly created, for instance, to display particularly strong
performance to challenge existing institutions and attract sufficient capital to expand. This
result is consistent with the findings of Ferreira et al. (2013) for funds outside the United
States as well as Otten & Bams (2002) for EEMFs. Volatility exhibits a positive sign, as
more volatile funds tend to outperform their peers (the variable is not significant in Sun
et al. 2012). Eventually, the autoregressive term is found to be statistically significant and
positive, exhibiting signs of strong persistence in outperformance, consistent with the idea of
skilled managers being able to outperform persistently.
13Such a correction has become standard in this strand of the literature (see Sun et al. (2012), Ferreira
et al. (2013), Vozlyublennaia & Wu (2017)).
14To the best of our knowledge, we are the first study to provide empirical evidence on strategy distinc-
tiveness for European mutual funds.
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Turning to the cluster-specific characteristics, we first note their high significance. This set
of controls aims to account for cluster-level heterogeneity in fund performance. For instance,
applying Ardia & Boudt (2018)’s procedure, we might fail to detect any statistical differ-
ence in excess returns among all the funds constituting a cluster. In this extreme case, the
outperformance ratio would be zero for all the funds in the cluster. Alternatively, a cluster
can exhibit marked differences across funds and be associated with a positive average ratio.
Pooled together, the data display cluster-level heterogeneity that remains unexplained by
the fund-specific attributes and that we aim to capture by including this additional category
of variables. All four variables are significant at the 1% or 5% level. Cluster size displays
a positive sign, indicating that funds tend to outperform peers in large style-based clusters.
Conversely, clusters including large funds—as measured by the average AUM per fund—and
well-performing funds (estimated by their average net return) tend to lower the value of out-
performance. The same holds true for clusters distinct from the overall market. The more
innovative the style, the more difficult it is for funds following this style to outperform their
cluster peers.
We now consider the remaining columns of Table 1.10 (columns II to VII). For the adaptive
approach (columns II to V), we note the strong and robust effect of the SDI on financial
performance, measured by either cluster-based outperformance or the more traditional four-
factor alpha. We find strong consistency between the results of our main model in column
I and those of the alternative models using the adaptive setting (columns II to V). Neither
the application of the OLS method (column II) instead of GLM nor the exclusion of the
autoregressive term (columns III and V) affects the significance of the coefficients for the
outperformance ratio and four-factor alpha. We now compare the results of the adaptive
approach (columns I to V) with those of the non-adaptive approach (columns VI and VII).
The SDI is positive and significant under both approaches. Nevertheless, the comparison also
displays three notable differences. First, the statistical significance is stronger for the SDI
under the adaptive approach. Second, for the other variables, the conclusion on the statistical
significance of the coefficients alters in some cases. Hence, for the 10 regressors tested, we
draw a different conclusion for three of them (column I vs. column VI). The signs of the co-
efficients also differ, as three parameters display the opposite signs (column I vs. column VI).
In Table 1.11, we explore the non-linear effects in the relationship between the SDI and fund
outperformance. To this end, we extend our main model (column I) and add a new regressor
constructed as the interaction between our variable of interest (i.e., the SDI) and another
variable driving the non-linearity. Each interaction regressor is included in a separate re-
gression. Overall, four types of effects are assessed. First, we test whether more innovative
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strategies are rewarded differently in crisis periods. For this purpose, we consider three crisis
indicators: (i) a dummy variable for the European crisis (ECD) that takes the value of 1
from January 2008 to March 2009 and from July 2011 to March 201315 and 0 otherwise
(column II), (ii) a dummy variable for the global financial crisis (GCD) that takes the value
of 1 from December 2007 to May 2009 and 0 otherwise (column III), and (iii) Vstocxx that
captures market uncertainty in Europe (column IV). Second, we separate within-cluster and
between-cluster distinctiveness strategies. Specifically, we test whether the outcome on out-
performance is different when innovative strategies are implemented within clusters distant
from the rest of the industry (column V). Third, we investigate the existence of a change in
the relationship of interest as funds become more distinct. To this end, we include the SDI
variable with a quadratic term (column VI). A positive coefficient for the SDI variable and
a negative sign for the coefficient attached to the quadratic term suggests that the beneficial
effect of a distinctive strategy dampens as such differentiation increases. In other words,
being distinct improves financial performance; however, the marginal effect vanishes as a
fund’s strategy departs from its peers. Fourth, we include the variation of the SDI (column
VII) to assess the potential cost of the transition toward more distinctive strategies that are
less known by the market and for which fund managers have less expertise. This effect is
captured by including the first difference of the SDI in the previous period, ∆SDIt−1.
The results reach significance for the two models that test the effect of the crisis. Each time,
the coefficients of the SDI and interaction term are positive, indicating that the effect of
the SDI is exacerbated in periods of stress. Hence, relative to normal times, being able to
implement an innovative strategy in difficult times enables earning higher excess returns than
close competitors on average. The coefficient attached to Cluster-SDI ∗ SDI is negative and
statistically significant, which suggests that the more distinctive a style, the more difficult it
is to take advantage of a within-style distinctive strategy. Moving to the next column, the
coefficient attached to the quadratic form of the SDI shows negative statistical significance.
Therefore, although the effect in our sample is strongly positive, evidence of non-linearity
exists, and the marginal effect dies out as the SDI grows. Our results are strongly significant
for the parameter attached to ∆SDIt−1. This shows that a rapid shift toward more innovative




Table 1.11: Outperformance and SDI: Non-linear models
Panel Regressions












































































































































































Fund clustering effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 334.072 334.072 334.072 333,968 334.072 334.072 334.072
# of funds 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284
Avg Obs per fund 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 13.48 13.51 13.50 8.54 13.54 13.82 13.91
Fstat 231.17*** 231.77*** 231.57*** 2,353*** 232.36*** 237.94*** 239.73***
Note: Table 1.11 reports panel regressions results where our baseline model is extended to account for non-linear effects.
Column I and II report the interaction variables between SDI and an European crisis dummy ECD (II) or a global crisis
dummy GCD (III). Column IV reports the results while using a market volatility variable Vstocxx rather than time fixed
effect as an interaction variable. Column V uses cluster-SDI as an interaction variable, while column VI includes a quadratic
form for the SDI. Finally, Column VII tests for style drift risk. Fund and cluster variables are identical to Table 1.7. The
robust t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for fund clustering effect and time fixed effect. ***1% significance;
**5% significance; *10% significance.
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1.4.2 Determinants of the SDI
Column I in Table 1.12 displays the results for the reference model in which the coefficients
are estimated by GLM. The specification includes an autoregressive term and the SDI is
recovered using the AFFECT algorithm. Columns II to III are added to test the robustness
of our conclusions. Column II, the specification, is the same as in column I, but we drop
the autoregressive term. Finally, in column III, the SDI is computed using a rolling window
approach as in Sun et al. (2012).
All the fund-level variables, with the exception of net flow, significantly influence the SDI.
This result holds in all cases but one at the 1% level and is consistent across the three models.
The sign of the coefficient is negative for the variable depicting the size of the fund and its
age. These results are consistent with the findings of Sun et al. (2012) on U.S. hedge funds.
The interpretations of fund age and size are not straightforward. As it stands, the negative
sign of the coefficient indicates that large and old funds are less prone to follow a distinctive
strategy. Several mechanisms could be at play to explain this result. For instance, a fund
that has developed its own investment strategy identity and is recognized in the market
might have greater difficulty innovating. Likewise, when an investment has been made in
specific investment skills, the cost of shifting to an alternative strategy might be high. On
the contrary, newly established funds have greater latitude to pursue original and innovative
ideas. Small funds also face fewer constraints from long-term clients regarding modifying
their investment practices. However, these conjectures about the channels through which
size and age affect the SDI cannot be formally tested within our framework. Similar to Sun
et al. (2012), greater volatility is also found to be less prone to innovation. Turning to the
cluster-level variables, cluster meancap and cluster SDI are shown to be positive contributors,
while small clusters seem to be populated by more distinct funds.
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Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Fund clustering effect Yes Yes Yes
# of observations 334.073 334.073 347,115
# of funds 4.285 4.285 4,267
Avg Obs per fund 78 78 81.3
R2 66.49 45.82 90.14
Fstat 2,957*** 1,266*** 15,778***
Note: Table 1.12 reports the panel regressions results for EEMFs’ SDI drivers at the monthly frequency:
SDIt+1 = β0,i + β1,iFundvariablei,t + β2,iClustervariablei,t + εi,t Column I and II report results in the
adaptive setting for dynamic panel regression and panel regression respectively. Column III reports the
results in the non-adaptive setting. Fund and cluster variables are identical to Table 1.7. The robust
t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for fund clustering effect and time fixed effect ***1%
significance; **5% significance; *10% significance.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this analysis, we describe the main characteristics of the EEMF industry over the past
two decades. To this end, we create a novel database from Morningstar comprising 4,957
EEMFs. Equipped with these data, we use a regression approach to test whether distinctive
strategies—as measured by the distance of a fund’s returns from the average return of its
style-based cluster—are significantly associated with excess performance. Next, we explore
the determinants of strategy distinctiveness. We contribute to the literature in three main
ways. First, we take particular care in handling several econometric issues that have been
overlooked in previous work on strategy distinctiveness and fund performance. To this end,
we apply a modified version of Sun et al. (2012)’s SDI based on the adaptive clustering
approach called AFFECT, which was developed by Xu et al. (2014). This method relies
on a limited set of assumptions and allows us to retrieve mutual funds’ styles endogenously
over time, thereby addressing changes in the number of styles, funds’ shifts in style, and
the entry and exit of funds. In addition, we apply the recent approach of Ardia & Boudt
(2018) to formally test the difference in performance across peers. Second, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the first study to assess the impact of strategy distinctiveness in the context
of EEMFs. Third, we explore the non-linear relationship between financial performance and
strategy distinctiveness.
Our results show that distinctiveness among EEMFs decreased sharply before the crisis before
increasing and eventually hitting a new low in recent months. We find a strong, robust,
and positive impact of strategy distinctiveness on financial performance. Interestingly, our
analysis also unveils the existence of non-linear effects. In particular, we find a decreasing
marginal effect as funds become more distinct. Hence, although following innovative and
distinctive strategies pays off on average, the effect is actually non-linear and exhibits a
threshold level over which being too different becomes useless. Eventually, a fund’s size and
age are found to be significantly negative determinants of an innovative strategy.

Chapter 2
Portfolio Concentration and Financial
Performance: Insights From Domestic and
Global Equity Mutual Funds
2.1 Introduction
While traditional portfolio theory suggests that asset managers should hold shares of a wide
variety of individual stocks to eliminate the portfolio idiosyncratic risk (Markowitz 1952,
Jensen 1969, Statman 1987, 2004), a rapid scrutiny of asset management practices and aca-
demic studies cast doubts on whether passive diversified strategies are unanimously viewed
as beneficial. In recent years, many study based on information advantage theory found
evidence that some skilful managers were able to outperform their peers persistently by
concentrating their portfolio1, or in other words, by deviating from a perfectly diversified
portfolio. The main intuition behind portfolio concentration is that managers endowed with
superior information and/or superior skills will over-weight their ”best-ideas”, hence the po-
sitions on which they have the strongest beliefs. This debate between concentration versus
diversification benefits can be traced back to two major schools of thoughts initiated by
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Markowitz respectively (Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal & Wang
2012). To paraphrase, the former advocates to invest relatively larger sums into firms with
which one has better familiarity, because managers’ knowledge and experience are limited
1See for instance, Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Brands et al. (2005), Baks, Busse & Green (2007), Cremers
& Petajisto (2009), Huij & Derwall (2011), Amihud & Goyenko (2013), Choi et al. (2017), Fulkerson & Riley
(2019)
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and should be used to the fullest extent (Keynes, Johnson & Moggridge 1983). As stated
in Boyle et al. (2012), others academics and professionals have supported this view such
as Loeb (2007) which states that diversification is an admission of inexperience aiming at
reaching an average, or Warren Buffet with is well known moto “Never invest in a business
you cannot understand”. Yet, portfolio concentration is not limited to asset concentration,
as some managers may “bet”” on specific risk factors on which their have supposedly better
information to reap excess performance.
However, the way to properly define and evaluate portfolio concentration as well as its link to
managerial skill are still very much debated. In the literature, portfolio concentration either
refers to stock concentration (stock selectivity), risk concentration (risk factor exposures)
or a combination of both. For instance, Baks et al. (2007) and Fulkerson & Riley (2019),
measure a portfolio’s stock concentration on absolute terms using its underlying weights dis-
tribution. Others, such as Brands et al. (2005) and most notably Cremers & Petajisto (2009)
—with the “Active Share”—, define portfolio concentration as the extend to which the
fund’s portfolio deviates from its referential benchmark. Regarding the risk concentra-
tion, Cremers & Petajisto (2009) define it as a deviation in risk exposures from a refer-
ential benchmark (active risk). Alternatively, Amihud & Goyenko (2013) propose to use the
R-square stemming from a multi-factor model to evaluate a fund systematic risk exposure,
while Kacperczyk et al. (2005) evaluate it on absolute term with the “Industry concentration
Index”. Similarly, studies by Merton (1987), Levy & Livingston (1995), Van Nieuwerburgh
& Veldkamp (2009) define concentration through the over-weighting of domestic stock (com-
monly known as the “homebias”).
In this paper, we wish to contribute to the debate by proposing a holding-based methodology
to evaluate portfolio concentration, both in stocks and risk factor exposures2. However, we
depart from the literature in the way we evaluate the later. We propose to determine the
risk factors —used to measure the risk concentration— endogenously through a principal
component analysis (PCA) on their holdings’ returns. Our main contribution lies in two key
characteristics of the measure.
First, given that the factors are determined endogenously we argue that our framework should
be more flexible than traditional multi-factor models applied to US or international funds.
Indeed, while the identification of risk factors may be trivial for the US market3, the task
becomes less straightforward when considering other geographic areas such as Europe, where
2In the spirit of Cremers & Petajisto (2009)
3The vast majority of studies concerning managers activeness and or portfolio concentration are based on
US mutual funds with domestic strategies (see for instance Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Cremers & Petajisto 2009,
Amihud & Goyenko 2013, Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp 2014) and as such use well documented
economic-based risk factors tailored for the US market such as industry factors or traditional style factors
(SMB, HML, MOM)
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investment profiles are much more diverse. For instance, some European managers invest
massively in their domestic market, other in foreign European countries, while a preponder-
ant part are global funds investing in many parts of the world4 (EFAMA 2017). Identifying
their set of relevant factors becomes then much more demanding. To circumvent this is-
sue, the general consensus is to group the potential factors in three distinct factor models,
namely: style, sector, and country5. Yet, as pointed-out by Huij & Derwall (2011), it is un-
clear whether such models capture distinct dimensions of risk. In fact, industry factors may
very well capture the same underlying risk as country or style factors. Therefore, we propose
to remain agnostic about the potential unobserved risk factors by relying on statistical ones
determined endogenously from the data. To do so, we apply a methodology stemming from
the risk budgeting literature6 which relies on a PCA applied to the portfolio holdings’ returns.
It allows —for each fund— to effectively uncover uncorrelated risk factors7, and then retrieve
their respective contribution to the portfolio variance (Meucci 2010, Meucci, Santangelo &
Deguest 2015, Roncalli & Weisang 2016). Thus, we use our measure to proxy the breadth
of the underlying strategy (i.e., the number of independent investment decisions)8 by distin-
guishing managers specializing their investments and displaying strong exposure to a single
source of risk (Focused) from those willing to scale their investment strategy by “betting” on
multiple risk factors (Dispersed).This definition resonates with the one of Grinold & Kahn
(2000) which define strategy breadth as the number of investment decisions based on distinct
information sets (i.e. the number of independent forecast). We argue that a higher number
of independent forecasts will translate into broader exposures to uncorrelated risk factors,
thus justifying our method.
Second, both our measures are absolute and as such do not rely on a pre-specified bench-
mark. Indeed, benchmark-centric measures are by design highly sensitive to the choice of the
referential benchmark and may be misleading if the benchmark is not appropriately chosen
(Sensoy 2009), moreover they do not accommodate well with multi-benchmark strategy as
demonstrated by Amihud & Goyenko (2013). Therefore, solely relying on the managers port-
folio’s allocations — and associated returns— to highlight their risk exposures (Focused vs
Dispersed), allows to avoid such limitations. The same logic holds true for the stock concen-
tration measure, thus we follow Baks et al. (2007) and Fulkerson & Riley (2019) and define it
4The European market is the largest hub for global funds worldwide. Luxembourg alone, accounts for 1
out of 10 global fund worldwide EFAMA (2017)
5See for instance, Fama & French (1993, 1998, 2017), Jegadeesh & Titman (1993), Huij & Derwall (2011),
Banegas et al. (2013), Tsai & Wu (2015), Choi et al. (2017)
6See Roncalli (2013) for a literature review
7Although this property comes at the price of non-interpretability of factors, we are interested in the
distribution of portfolio risk not the identification of its sources.
8See Grinold & Kahn (2000), Huij & Derwall (2011)
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directly through the portfolio weights9. Indeed, the portfolio weights distribution is a natural
proxy for stock concentration, if managers overweight some positions in the portfolio (Stock
picks), their concentration level will rise. On the other hand, if they allocate similar weights
across each portfolio holdings (Diversified), it will decrease.
Our empirical analysis is based on a set of 1,746 equity mutual funds domiciled in Eu-
rope for the period 2003Q1-2016Q4. We collect the entirety of our data from Morningstar
direct, which is a global leader data provider for the mutual fund industry (Del Guercio &
Tkac 2008). More specifically, we retrieve at a quarterly frequency the portfolio holdings
composition of each fund. We also extract the daily closing price of each of the portfolio
holdings along our time horizon. Then, using the funds portfolio weights attached to each
unique position at each quarter, we are able to compute the stock concentration using the
Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI henceforth). Similarly, based on the funds holdings daily
log-returns, we are able at each quarter10 to determine the uncorrelated risk factors impact-
ing the portfolio thanks to a PCA analysis. Finally, using an inverse HHI (HHI−1)11 on the
percentage of portfolio variance explained by each factors, we determine how many of them
truly impact its risk (effective number of factors). We argue that their numbers is a natural
proxy for a fund’s strategy breadth and therefore use it as the risk concentration measure12.
In a last exercise, we investigate the relation between the funds concentration measures
and their manager’s skill. To do do, we cross our two axes of concentration to distinguish
different active strategies and test for their performance. We highlight four distinct categories
characterised by the combination of either low or high concentration in stocks (Diversified vs
Stock picks ) and risk factors (Dispersed vs Focused), and a fifth category —labelled Core—
representing funds neither highly concentrated nor diversified in stocks and risk exposures.
Our main results highlight that funds able to pick stocks while spreading their risk expo-
sitions (Dispersed stock picks) are able to outperform their peers. These results are robust
to alternative definitions of both concentration measures and held true during the financial
crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly summarise the liter-
ature. In Section 3, we describe our methodology and data sources. Section 4 presents our
results. Robustness analysis is performed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
9This departs from the stock selection proxy of Cremers & Petajisto (2009), the “Active Share” which
measure the extent to which a fund deviate from its benchmark.
10Using rolling windows of the preceding two years worth of daily returns
11The inverse HHI allows to compute the effective number of elements on which it is applied to (in our
case, stocks or risk factors)
12Please note that in this case lower values of the measure are representative of concentrated strategies
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2.2 Literature Review
While the consensus reached in the academic literature over the last decades points to the
inability of active mutual funds managers to cover their costs13, a recent strand of the litera-
ture finds evidence that some skilled managers —concentrating their portfolio— are able to
outperform their peers. The rational behind this new strand of the literature is that informa-
tional advantages14 may allow some manager to generate return in excess of their costs. For
instance, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) demonstrated that US equity funds’ managers concentrat-
ing their allocations in few industries where they have informational advantages are able to
generates positive abnormal net returns for their investors.15 Baks et al. (2007) highlight that
funds willing to takes large bets on a restricted set of positions outperform their competitors
and generate excess net returns for their investors. Furthermore, Cremers & Petajisto (2009)
which define the portfolio activeness alongside two axes: stock picking (Active Share) and
factor bets (Tracking error)16, highlight that US equity funds displaying both high stock se-
lectivity and either low or high tracking errors (i.e., diversified & concentrated stock pickers
respectively) earn positive net performance compared to their benchmark. Gupta-Mukherjee
(2013) builds on Cremers & Petajisto (2009) but rather use an active peer-benchmark to
compare the funds performance. This synthetic benchmark represents the composite beliefs
(position held by at least two funds) of the funds peers. In response to the body of literature
previously detailed advocating for risk concentrated strategies, Huij & Derwall (2011) aim to
reconcile the two axioms of the fundamental law of active management17 which states that
activeness is driven by managerial skills (stock selectivity) and the breadth of the underlying
strategy (i.e the number of independent investment decisions). Thus, the authors propose to
focus on the decomposition of the portfolios’ active risk sources, rather than only considering
its idiosyncratic risk level (i.e., Tracking error). To do so, they use global mutual funds
and analyse their loading on sector, country and style factors. Their findings corroborates
that concentrated funds (high tracking error) do outperform, yet that funds concentrated
in all three risk sources display significantly higher tracking error than those only exposed
13See for instance, Jensen (1969), Gruber (1996), Daniel et al. (1997b), Carhart (1997), Malkiel (1995),
Wermers (2000)
14Better knowledge of the home market (Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp 2009), better expertise on specific
markets Kacperczyk et al. (2005), etc.
15Similarly,Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp (2009) found evidence than funds concentrated in their country
of domicile (domestic strategies) were able to outperform internationally diversified ones. This phenomenon,
commonly known as the “homebias”can be explained by informational advantages and learning skills
16The former refers to the absolute sum of a fund portfolio’s holdings deviation from its benchmark, while
the later refers to its active risk (tracking error)
17See, Grinold (1989), Grinold & Kahn (2000)
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to one or two, hence reconciling tracking error with the breadth of the underlying strategy.
More recently, Amihud & Goyenko (2013) proposed a novel measure of risk concentration.
They use the R-square (R2) stemming from a multi-factors regressions on a fund’s returns to
proxy its idiosyncratic risk exposure18 (1-R2), and find that lower R2 funds outperform their
benchmark. Finally, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) and Choi et al. (2017) extend the literature,
the former by studying the dynamics of stocks selection and market timing for US funds, the
latter by extending the scope of previous studies to engulf institutional investors worldwide.
Kacperczyk et al. (2014) uses Daniel et al. (1997b) “Characteristic Selectivity” (CS ) and
“Characteristic Timing” (CT )19 and find that funds able to pick stocks in expansion and
time the market in recession are the overall best, even after fees. Choi et al. (2017) shows
that funds concentrated in industries and/or international markets may be optimal.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Data on funds and funds constituents
We extract raw data regarding EMFs from Morningstar direct. Among key advantages of
the database are its comprehensive coverage across countries for funds and securities, as well
as the availability of information regarding the funds’ historical portfolio holdings, hence
allowing us to use a single unified database20. We restrict our selection to funds domiciled in
Europe21, which includes 18 countries and 2 microstates22, and extract the portfolio holdings
of 2749 EMFs at a quarterly frequency for the 2003Q1-2016Q4 period. Then, we apply suc-
cessive filters consistent with the literature (see for instance Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Ferreira
et al. 2013), by excluding fund of funds, index tracking funds, funds with less than e1 million
of asset under management, less than 5 holding positions, less than 2 quarters of holdings
18The higher the R2 the more closely a fund follows the market, thus the less active it is
19CS measures the ability to select stocks that outperform those with similar characteristics, CT measures
the ability to time their portfolio weights on specific characteristics
20Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Cremers & Petajisto (2009), Kacperczyk et al. (2014) for instance have to
merge the CDA and CRSP database which can lead to data mismatch (Zhu 2020)
21As previously detailed, Europe offers a privilege laboratory to analyse risk concentration of mutual
funds, given the vast diversity of strategies represented (domestic, international, global, etc.)
22Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. Guernesey and Liechtenstein
36 2.3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
information, and finally less than 2 years worth of consecutive monthly returns. We further
exclude funds invested in less than 75% of common stocks and focus on long-only portfo-
lios. Then, at each quarter we match the funds holdings with the information retrieved on
Morningstar regarding the stocks, which to be included, must have complete daily returns
information over the previous two years (∼ 506 days)23. After this matching procedure, we
exclude funds with less than 60% of their portfolio represented. We end-up with 1,746 Eu-
ropean EMFs24.
Information on fund attributes are available at various frequencies, for the purpose of the
present study and for the horizon 2001-2016, we collect gross and net funds’ monthly re-
turns along with the funds’ monthly total net assets (TNA)25. We also retrieve the funds’
complete managerial history, the inception date of their oldest share, their domicile country
and area of investment. With these data at hands, we compute the net expense ratio (NER
henceforth) of each fund as in Elton, Gruber & Blake (2013) by subtracting the monthly
gross returns of our funds from their monthly net returns. We further compute the turnover
ratio by taking the percentage of a fund’s TNA represented by the total number of assets
purchased or sold between two periods, whichever is less (Amihud & Goyenko 2013). Then,
we create a dummy variable to distinguish funds that are managed by a team (Team =1)
from the one run by a single manager (Team =0). Turning to the funds’ quarterly net flows,
we follow the methodology of Ferreira et al. (2013)26. Finally, the abnormal performance is
computed with a Fama-French (FF) three factor model (Fama & French 1993), where the
factors are computed through MSCI indexes, as done in Huij & Derwall (2011).To obtain
correct estimates of each fund’s performance level, the first step is to create categories for
our funds according to their main investment area. Morningstar uses information available
on prospectus to select the funds’ principal area of investment. The funds in our sample are
distributed into 50 distinct investment areas which can be summarised into 5 main regions
(Global, Asia, Europe, US, Emerging). Table 2.1 provides an overview of the number of
funds attributed to each investment areas and main investment regions. We observe that
the majority of funds in our sample are invested either globally or in European countries
23When less than 10 consecutive days are missing we linearly interpolate the price used to retrieve the
returns
24Closest studies in terms of dataset are the ones of Graef et al. (2019) Franck & Kerl (2013). The former
consider 1464 European funds with portfolio holdings at a quarterly frequency over the 2001 2017 period,
the later collected portfolio holdings for 4315 European funds yet restricted their sample to the 20005-2009
period at a semiannual frequency.
25If multiple shares are available we retrieve the aggregated TNA at the fund level
26
Flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1 +Ri,t)
TNAt,t−1
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Table 2.1: Funds’ Investment Area
Investment Areas (IA) Number of funds Main Regions
Asia Emerging Mkts 3 Emerging
Asia Pacific 23 Asia
Asia Pacific ex Japan 36 Asia




China (Greater) 10 Asia
Emerging Europe,Middle East and Africa 4 Emerging
Euroland 150 Europe
Europe 382 Europe
Europe (North) 10 Europe
Europe Emerging Mkts 35 Emerging





Global Emerging Mkts 120 Emerging




Latin America 10 Emerging
Netherlands 4 Europe
North America 5 US
Russia & CIS 12 Europe
Switzerland 4 Europe
United Kingdom 14 Europe
United States of America 181 US
Note: Table 2.1 reports the investment areas and regions of the funds in our sample as well as the number
of funds associated to them. For the sake of clarity, we have excluded from the table IA with less than 3
fund attached to them, which include Africa, ASEAN country, Australia, Austria, BRIC, Czech Republic
,Global ex Euroland, Greece, Indonesia, Korea, Middle East, Middle East & Africa, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand and finally Turkey
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(440 and 691 funds respectively). The rest of the sample is split between funds investing
in Asia, Emerging markets and finally in the US (178, 271 and 186 funds respectively). As
documented, funds investing in Europe are either following a domestic strategy (for instance
Italy with 15 funds or Belgium with 3 funds) or investing in some European countries (150
funds invest solely in ”Euroland” countries).
We extract from Morningstar the MSCI indexes of each main region, in order to compute
their respective factors. To get each regions size premium (SMB) we subtract their MSCI
Small Cap index from their overall MSCI index27. Similarly, the value premia (HML) are
computed by subtracting the respective MSCI Growth indexes from their MSCI Value in-
dexes28. Finally, the Market premia (RMRF ) are computed in excess from the European
risk free rate. We select the 1-month European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) rate
as a proxy of the short term risk free rate following Auer (2016). Thus, we compute the
performance as follows:
Ri,j −RF = αi,j + β1RMRFj + β2SMBj + β3HMLj + εf (2.1)
where Ri,j is the monthly net return of fund i investing in region j, RF
29 is the risk free
rate and alpha is the fund abnormal performance. RMRFj represents the regional markets
risk premia, SMBj and HMLj are the regional small cap and value premia respectively.
2.3.2 Concentration measures
2.3.2.1 Portfolio’s stock concentration
In order to asses the stock concentration of our mutual funds’ portfolio at a quarterly fre-
quency, we use a measure stemming from the industrial organisation literature, used as a
market concentration index: the Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI). In this study, we ap-
27For instance the SMB for global funds is the monthly difference between the MSCI World index and the
MSCI World Small Cap index
28The momentum factor cannot be retrieved through indexes, which motivated the use of the FF three-
factor model, as done by closet study to ours Huij & Derwall (2011)
29As in Auer (2016) we propose an alternative test using a constant RF representing the average RF of
our entire time span. The results are almost identical and are available upon request
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ply the HHI on the portfolio positions (ωHHI )
30 in order to evaluate how “asymmetric” the
manager’s weighting strategy is. As stated previously, managers may decide to overweight
their “best ideas” (core positions) which will mechanically increase the ωHHI , or try to reap






where ωi,j,t is a weight of the fund’s portfolio i allocated to stock j at time t. N is the total
number of unique stock positions composing the portfolio.
2.3.2.2 Portfolio’s risk concentration
Computing the funds’ risk concentration is less straightforward. Indeed, one can argue that
economic-based factors such as industry, country or style factors can be used to proxy the
funds risk concentration. Yet, as stated previously, two major issues arise. First, the potential
number of eligible factors —when dealing with highly heterogeneous funds— may become
very large and difficult to handle. Second, economic-based factors while very intuitive to
interpret, are correlated with each others. Therefore, studying the contribution to portfolio
risk of each factors may lead to under-estimate the true risk concentration if a sub-group
actually proxy the same underlying risk source.
Thus, we propose to uncover uncorrelated risk factors directly from the portfolio holdings.
As noted by Meucci (2010), the most natural candidates are the factors stemming from a
PCA on the funds covariance matrix “Σ”. PCA, is a dimensionality reducing tool allowing
to ease the interpretability of large datasets while at the same time minimising the loss of
information. The procedure transforms a set of “N” correlated variables (here stocks) into a
set of “N” orthogonal variables called eigen vectors or in our case principal portfolios (PPs,
henceforth). Each PP is assumed to represent an unobserved risk factor and is associated
to an eigen value which represent the portion of risk the PP accounts for. PPs are ranked
according to the magnitude of their eigen values, this way, the first one accounts for as much
30As stated previously, we only focus on the portfolio stock positions, which may not sum to 100%. First
funds with less than 60% of their portfolio represented are excluded, then to ensure comparability, we re-scale
the portfolio positions to sum-up to 100%
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risk as possible, and each subsequent PPs for as much of the residual risk as possible31. Thus,
we decompose the portfolio covariance matrix as follows:
Σ ≡ E′ΛE (2.3)
where E represent the matrix of PPs and their corresponding eigen values (λi) are contained in
the diagonal matrix Λ in decreasing order. To implement this method we use for each fund at
each quarter, a matrix made of the normalised daily log returns from the portfolio underlying
positions over the preceding two years (∼ 506 working days). After having identified the
uncorrelated sources of risk arising from each manager’s selected set of assets, we are able to
analyse their relative contribution for the portfolio variance. As showed by Meucci (2010) and
Roncalli & Weisang (2016), the portfolio overall return (Ri) can be expressed as a combination
of the original weights (ωi,j) and their associated stocks’ returns(rj) : Ri =
∑N
j=1 ωi,j ∗ rj or
as a combination of their PPs with weights : ω̃ ≡ E−1ω. Then, the portfolio variance can





where σ2i represents the portfolio variance of fund i, ω̃
2
i,n is the squared weight attached to
the nth PP and λi,n its eigen value. Then, to isolate the % of variance explained by each risk





While the PPs themselves are not straightforward to interpret32, their pn are of great in-
terest to us. Given their additive property we can apply a traditional measure of concen-
31See Jolliffe & Cadima (2016) for a detailed review of principal component analysis and its applications
32Indeed, the endogenous factors are not identifiable, as such it is not possible to link them to traditional
economic-based factors. However, they provide useful information regarding the risk exposures of the portfolio
given their uncorrelated nature
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tration/diversification in order to evaluate the portfolio risk concentration. In this case, we
propose to use an inverse HHI, which conversely to the original index is a measure of diver-








This measure relates to the breadth of the underlying strategy, defined by Grinold & Kahn
(2000) as the number of independent investment decisions, and is an alternative of the model
devised by Huij & Derwall (2011). However our methodology, contrary to theirs, does not
rely on predefined economic-based risk factors and provides a more flexible framework to
study global, international or domestic funds together.
To sum-up, Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of our main variables. The funds in
our sample are at the median worth e221 million and are on average 10 years old. The
majority of funds are run by a single manager and their average turnover and expense ratio
are around 15.5% and 1.6% respectively. The average quarterly net flows is positive (3.73%)
with a standard deviation of 26.86%, reflecting a growth in this segment of the industry over
our sample period, but also marked heterogeneity. The funds in our sample invest on average
into 86 different stocks, yet some invest in more than 700 assets while others in less that 20.
Regarding the portfolio stock concentration (ωHHI), the average level is quite low, with a
value of 278.3533, showing signs that managers tend to diversify across their asset allocations.
On the contrary, the majority of funds tends to be mostly exposed to 1 unobserved risk factor
(PHHI−1) which support the idea that the average manager specialises its investments in a
specific market which overall movement explains most of the portfolio variance. Conversely,
some managers are able to bet on up to 5 different unobserved factors. Finally, the average
net performance of our funds is around -0.29% (quarterly), which corroborates the general
literature consensus concerning the average inability of active managers to cover their costs.
Our results are in line with Ferreira et al. (2013), which is to date the most extensive research
on mutual funds worldwide. Their European funds, are for instance on average worth $267
million are 12 years old and have a quarterly mean performance of -0,38%.
33ωHHI is bound from 1 to 10000
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std Min Max
#Assets) 85.80 59.00 92.43 19.00 749.00
Age (years) 10.34 8.83 8.02 0.25 45.51
Alpha (FF)(% Quarterly) -0.29 -0.40 2.06 -6.40 6.28
PHHI−1 1.08 1.05 0.11 1.00 5.81
ωHHI 278.35 245.22 151.86 39.57 942.34
Flow (%) 3.73 -0.96 26.86 -43.44 171.00
NER(% Annual) 1.60 1.59 0.51 0.19 3.35
Team 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
TNA (eM) 443.72 221.05 669.57 5.11 4222.33
Turnover (% Quarterly) 15.54 13.14 10.12 1.57 54.67
Vol (% 24 months) 4.72 4.38 1.82 2.03 10.80
Note: Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables over the 2003Q1 to 2016Q4 pe-
riod. More precisely it reports the mean, median, standard deviation minimum and maximum of the
funds’ number of assets, age expressed in years, the risk adjusted performance ( alpha FF) over the
quarter, the stock concentration (ωHHI ) and effective number of factor (PHHI−1) , the net flows,
the annual net expense ratio (NER), a dummy variable (Team) taking the value 1 if a fund is teamed
managed 0 otherwise , the funds total net assets (TNA) and finally their quarterly turnover ratio.
2.3.3 Portfolio concentration and fund’s performance
In this section, we propose different models to test the impact of concentration measures
on performance, first on a stand-alone basis, then in interaction. Finally, we distinguish
five different managerial styles —based on portfolio concentration profiles— and asses their
relative skill through their performance level.
To do so, first we estimate a panel regression forecasting the funds’ abnormal returns αi,t+1
based on the following model:
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αi,t+1 = β0 + βω ∗ ωHHIi,t + βP ∗PHHI−1i,t + βω,P ∗ (ωHHIi,t ∗PHHI−1i,t )
+
∑
j=1 βj ∗ Controlsj,i,t +
∑
k=1 FEk + εi,t+1
(2.7)
where both measures of concentration are first added on a stand-alone basis and then together
with their interaction term as in equation (2.7). Our goal is to identify the marginal impact of
the different concentration/diversification strategies and their potential interaction. However,
both measures could be correlated with other traits of mutual funds, such as their age or their
size. Therefore, to isolate our effects, we add a large set of controls. Following the literature
(Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Amihud & Goyenko 2013), we include the funds’ size computed
as the natural logarithm of their TNA (LN(TNA)), as well as the funds’ age computed as
the natural logarithm of the number of years since inception (LN(Age)). We further add the
funds’ net flows (Flow), and both turnover ratio (Turnover) and net expense ratio (NER).
Our final controls, are the funds’ returns volatility (Vol) computed as the standard deviation
of their monthly returns over the previous 24 months, and a dummy variable (Team) taking
the value 1 if the fund is managed by a team and 0 otherwise. Eventually, in line with Choi
et al. (2017), we add time, style and investment area fixed effects (FEk), and as usually done
in the literature, we lag all controls by one period and winsorize the continuous variable at
the 1% level.34
Then, in a second exercise we highlight five different types of active management (managerial
styles) and asses their link to subsequent performance in a similar setting than in equation
(2.7). The first step, is to define the managerial styles. Similarly to Cremers & Petajisto
(2009), we distinguish them along two axes: stock selection (ωHHI) and the strategy breadth
(PHHI−1).
34To ease the interpretation of our results, we standardized each continuous variable (zero mean and unit
standard deviation)
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Note: Figure 2.1 illustrates our managerial grid. The stock concentration (ωHHI ), proxy the stock selectiv-
ity of the manager by distinguishing funds which overweight some core positions (high) from those spread-
ing homogeneously their investments into multiple assets (low). The number of factors bets (PHHI−1)
on the other hand, distinguish funds concentrating on a few factors (low), from those spreading their
expositions though multiple risk sources (high). High refers to the 4rd and 5th quintiles of ωHHI and
PHHI−1 at each quarter taking into account all funds available. Similarly, low refers to the 1
st and 2nd
quintiles of both measures.
Figure 2.1 illustrates five distinct management styles. Dispersed Stock picks, refers to funds
highly concentrated in stocks, yet able to spread their risk factor exposures, thus effectively
broadening their strategy. Focused Stock picks, refers to funds concentrated both in stocks
and risk factors. Risk Focused funds, refers to those following a tight strategy yet homoge-
neously spreading their stock positions. Conversely, Risk Dispersed are funds spreading their
risk factor exposures while following an homogeneous stock weighting scheme. Finally, Core
refers to funds for which neither stocks nor factors concentration characteristics dominate.
Equipped with our new categories of active managers (see Figure 2.1), we use dummy vari-
ables to uncover their predictive power over their future performance levels:
αi,t+1 = β0 +
5∑
c=1
βc ∗ Categoryc,i,t +
∑
j=1
βj ∗ Controlsj,i,t +
∑
k=1
FEk + εi,t+1 (2.8)
where Categoryc,i,t represent the c
th dummy variables of management styles associated to
2.4. RESULTS 45
each fund at each quarter. To avoid perfect collinearity, we set one parameter (βc) among
the five category dummies equal to zero. The selected parameter provides the base effect
against which the four others coefficients should be compared to.
2.4 Results
Before gauging the relationships between our different active management styles and funds’
performance, Table 2.3 reports the results of our baseline models. Column I, reports the
coefficients of our controls on the funds risk-adjusted performance. LN(TNA) is a positive
drivers of future performance, in line with Ferreira et al. (2013). Indeed, the authors find
that traditional diseconomies of scale recurrent in the US regarding mutual funds are not
observed outside of the US, but that in fact there are signs of the opposite. Turning to
the positive sign of flows, it supports the findings of Gruber (1996) and its “smart money”
effect, which states than investors are able to uncover skilled managers and invest in their
funds. Regarding LN(Age) and Turnover, we highlight that they are negative drivers of
performances. The former result, is in line with Ferreira et al. (2013) and support the idea
that the performance deteriorates over a fund’s lifetime or in other words that young funds
tend to outperform older funds. The later, as described in Carhart (1997) tends to highlight
the negative impact of excessive trading (excessive transactions cost). Turning to the net
expense ratio (NER) and the returns volatility (Vol), we find that they negatively impact
the risk adjusted performance. Finally, we do not find any statistically significant impact of
the managerial structure (Team) on the funds subsequent performance levels. Columns II,
III and IV report respectively the marginal impact of stock concentration, strategy breadth,
and their interaction. The positive and highly significant sign of the ωHHI variable (0.040
at the 1% level) supports the hypothesis than funds which overweight their core positions,
are able to reap future abnormal returns (Baks et al. 2007, Fulkerson & Riley 2019). On
the other hand, the strongly positive and significant sign of PHHI−1 (0.047 at the 1% level)
tends to support the view of the risk budgeting literature (Roncalli 2013, Meucci 2010) which
advocates for strategies spreading their risk exposures through multiple risk factors. Finally,
when both strategies are examined together, we highlight that the interaction term is highly
significant and positive, moreover its coefficient (0.029 at the 1% level) is larger and more
significant (1% level) than both coefficients of the stock concentration (0.020 at the 10%
level) and strategy breadth (0.025 at the 5% level) measures. Hence, in line with Grinold &
Kahn (2000) and Huij & Derwall (2011), we find that skilled strategies are driven together
by stocks selection and the breadth of the underlying strategy. Throughout the results, we
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report both the value of the coefficients and the t-statistics, corrected for fund-level clustering,
in parenthesis35. In the lower part of the table, we include whether or not we use time, style
and country dummy, the number of funds and the number of observations.
Table 2.3: Baseline Models
Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1







LN(TNA) 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(4.97) (5.19) (4.91) (5.07)
LN(Age) -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.055***
(-4.74) (-4.89) (-4.80) (-5.03)
Flow 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165***
(20.52) (20.56) (20.60) (20.64)
Turnover -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.058***
(-8.13) (-7.24) (-7.94) (-7.29)
NER -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(-3.21) (-3.38) (-3.45) (-3.42)
Team 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.025
(1.42) (1.39) (1.50) (1.37)
Vol -0.093*** -0.104*** -0.087*** -0.093***
(-4.22) (-4.69) (-3.96) (-4.19)
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 1746 1746 1746 1746
Number of observations 47934 47934 47934 47934
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.3 reports the baseline panel regression of the net performance measure (alpha-FF) on lagged control vari-
ables. LN(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the fund total net assets. LN(Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund age
expressed in years. Flow designate the net fund level flow in % of the lagged value of TNA. NER and Turnover represent
respectively the net expense and turnover ratios. Team is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a fund is team managed,
0 otherwise and Vol represents the funds’ returns volatility over the previous 24 months . Finally ωHHI and PHHI−1 are
the measure of stock and risk concentration respectively. We include time, country and style fixed effect, the t-statistics
are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
35Such correction has become standard in this literature (see Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Amihud &
Goyenko 2013)
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2.4.1 Fund performance: stocks selection vs strategy breadth
So far, we have used concentration measures as continuous variables to asses their impact
on performance. To dive deeper into our analysis, in this section we propose to analyse the
performance of funds according to their bivariate distribution along ωHHI and PHHI−1 as
represented by the managerial grid in Figure 2.1. Table 2.4 reports for the entire sample, the
average performance (alpha-FF ) of funds according to their concentration measures quintiles.
At each quarter, we double sort funds according to both axes and take the time-series average
of their performance to compute their overall level over the period 2003Q1-2016Q4. The first
results we highlight is that concordant with the literature, on average active funds are unable
to covers their costs as demonstrated by the majority of results being significant and negative.
Yet, a closer look at funds which overweight their best idea the most while spreading their
risk across multiple risk sources, highlights that some skilled managers are able to generate
significant positive performances (at the 5 % level) persistently (Kacperczyk et al. 2005,
Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Amihud & Goyenko 2013, Kacperczyk et al. 2014). Given the
time span of our study (2003Q1-2016Q4) and the number of funds considered we argue
that the persistence of the aforementioned category’s outperformance makes a strong case
against performance being solely due to luck rather than managerial skills.36 Secondly, for
an equivalent high number of factor bets, funds which overweight their core stocks earn an
adjusted performance of more than 2% in excess from those spreading their asset allocation
homogeneously. Similarly, for an equivalent high level of stock concentration, funds able to
bet on multiple factors earn on average 1.6% more than those focusing on 1 factor. These
results further corroborates the interaction we observed in Table 2.3 and supports Grinold
& Kahn (2000) views on active management. Indeed, stock selection in combination with
strategy breadth are key drivers of future abnormal performance.
2.4.2 Active management and performance
Building on the previous section, we will test for the performance of each managerial styles
identified in Figure 2.1. To do so, at each quarter we create 5 distinct dummy variables
representing each different style (Focused Stock picks, Dispersed Stock picks, Risk focused,
36See Barras et al. (2010) for an extensive discussion of managerial luck versus skill
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Table 2.4: Alpha-FF EEMFS 2003Q1-2016Q4
PHHI−1 quintiles











Low -1.785*** -1.5*** -1.571*** -1.625*** -1.601*** 0,184
(-14) (-11) (-11) (-12) (-6.4) (0.65)
2 -1.973*** -1.358*** -1.22*** -1.16*** -0.671*** 1.302***
(-12) (-11) (-7.3) (-5.8) (-2.6) (4,2)
3 -1.888*** -1.238*** -.360* -.403** -0.140 1,748***
(-11) (-7.5) (-1,9) (-2.1) (-0.51) (5.4)
4 -1.645*** -1.305*** -.402** -0.315* 0.321 1.966***
(-8.5) (-5.8) (-2) (-1,7) (1.3) (6.3)
High -0.972* -1.128*** -.941*** .108 0.631** 1.603***
(-1.9) (-3.8) (-2.9) (0.39) (2.1) (2.7)
High-Low .813 0.382 0.630* 1.733*** 2.231***
(1.6) (1.1) (1.8) (5.5) (5.7)
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.4 reports the mean annualised alpha-FF (%) of all funds sorted by their ωHHI and
PHHI−1 from 2003Q1 to 2016Q4 (at each quarter).
Risk Dispersed and Core)37. Table 2.5 reports the results.
In Column I, the category Dispersed Stock picks is dropped. In accordance, the coefficients
of all four remaining dummies are expressed with respect to it. All four categories, are
shown to have a significant negative impact on future performance. More strikingly, all
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The sign is negative, that is, all four categories
perform significantly worse than the one representing funds with high stock selectivity and
high strategy breadth. For instance, the predicted differential in abnormal returns between
our referential category and the Risk Focused one (low stock selection and breadth) is about
0.12%. These results suggest that some funds able to keep a highly concentrated portfolio
(i.e small portfolio) while keeping a high level of diversity (large strategy breadth) are able to
alleviate the negative impact on portfolio diversification imposed by such asset concentration
and outperform the rest of the market.
Turning to Column II, we dropped our Core category represented by active funds which nei-
37More precisely, for instance funds at each quarter who belong simultaneously the 4th or 5th quintiles
of stock selectivity and number of effective factor are labelled “Dispersed stock picks” and the associated
dummy takes on the value 1. The rest of the categories are highlighted in Figure 2.1
2.4. RESULTS 49
Table 2.5: Active managerial categories and performance
Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1
I II III IV V
Dispersed Stock Picks 0.081*** 0.108*** 0.145*** 0.118***
(3.01) (3.62) (5.01) (4.03)
Core -0.081*** 0.027 0.064*** 0.037*
(-3.01) (1.16) (2.76) (1.67)
Focused Stock Picks -0.108*** -0.027 0.037 0.010
(-3.62) (-1.16) (1.38) (0.41)
Risk Disperse -0.145*** -0.064*** -0.037 -0.027
(-5.01) (-2.76) (-1.38) (-1.19)
Risk Focused -0.118*** -0.037* -0.010 0.027
(-4.03) (-1.67) (-0.41) (1.19)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of funds 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746
Number of observations 47934 47934 47934 47934 47934
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.5 reports the panel regressions of the funds’ performance on controls variables (defined as
in table 2.3) and managerial category dummies defined as in Figure 2.1. We include time, country and
style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level .
ther excessively concentrate nor diversify their stock or risk exposures. We see that results a
more mixed, Core are significantly out-performing Risk Dispersed and Risk Focused strate-
gies at the 1 and 10% respectively. Yet, as stated previously they under-perform Dispersed
stock picks and are not significantly different from Focused stock picks. The later category is
dropped in Column III, we do not find any significant differences with respect to the rest of
its peers at the exception of Dispersed Stock picks, which it under-performs by a differential
of approximately 0.11% at the 1% level. Finally, Column IV and V respectively reports
the results when the Risk Dispersed and Risk Focused category are dropped. Overall, these
results show that active mutual funds do implement strategies distinct from one another.
Moreover, we uncover evidence than those able to concentrate their allocation on their best
ideas (core stocks) while loading on multiples risk sources are the most skilled and outper-
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form significantly their peers. This finding once again supports Grinold & Kahn (2000) laws
of active management.
2.5 Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we conduct several robustness tests on the benchmark model with alternative
measures of both our stock selection and strategy breadth. Then, in a final setting, we test
for the performance of our active managerial categories during the financial crisis.
First, we propose an alternative definition of or stock concentration measure. We implement








where N is fund’s i total number of positions j at time t. The nHHI ranges from 0 to 1 and
has the particularity to be invariant to the total number of assets. As such, it only asses the
weights distributions. If a fund equally weights each position in its portfolio, its nHHI will be
0, conversely the less homogeneous the weighting scheme is, the closer to 1 the nHHI will be.
Table 2.6 reports the results and confirms the main findings of Table 2.5. Dispersed Stock
picks are still outperforming all others categories (albeit at the 5% level with respect to the
Focused Stock picks). However, we no longer observe any statistical differences between the
rest of the categories. Therefore, we conclude that the actual number of assets composing
the portfolio has an impact on its subsequent performance levels.38
Second, we propose an alternative measure of the strategy breadth. We use the “Effective
number of bets” measure devised by Meucci (2010). It closely relates to an inverse HHI
in the sense that it measures the actual number of factors a fund is exposed to. However,
it is based on the Shannon entropy, a measure used in information theory to quantify the
“uncertainty” linked to a random variable. The measure is defined as follows:
38When using the number of assets directly as a concentration measure, similar results arise as the
Dispersed Stock picks are once again outperforming all others categories. Yet, Risk Focused are no longer
significantly under-performing the Core category. The table is available upon request
2.5. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS 51
Table 2.6: Alternative ωHHI : Normalized HHI
Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1
I II III IV V
Dispersed Stock Picks 0.077*** 0.076** 0.081*** 0.079***
(3.03) (2.45) (2.67) (2.88)
Core -0.077*** -0.001 0.004 0.002
(-3.03) (-0.04) (0.18) (0.11)
Focused Stock Picks -0.076** 0.001 0.005 0.003
(-2.45) (0.04) (0.17) (0.13)
Risk Disperse -0.081*** -0.004 -0.005 -0.002
(-2.67) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.09)
Risk Focused -0.079*** -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(-2.88) (-0.11) (-0.13) (0.09)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of funds 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746
Number of observations 47934 47934 47934 47934 47934
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.6 reports reports an alternative setting for Table 2.5 where the measure of stock selectivity
in based on a normalised HHI on stock weights. We include time, country and style fixed effect and









where pn are the proportion of portfolio variance explained by the exposure of the fund to
its nth factor.
Table 2.7 confirms our main findings (see Table 2.5). Finally, as an extension, we propose to
analyse the predictive power of our managerial categories on performance during the crisis.
To do so, we set-up a cross-sectional analysis of the funds’ performance level during the crisis
on their managerial style taken prior to the crisis. First, controls (Controlspre-cs) are taken
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Table 2.7: Alternative PHHI−1 : Effective number of bets
Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1 Alpha-FFt+1
I II III IV V
Dispersed Stock Picks 0.090*** 0.111*** 0.143*** 0.120***
(3.28) (3.78) (4.89) (4.13)
Core -0.090*** 0.021 0.052** 0.030
(-3.28) (0.88) (2.16) (1.36)
Focused Stock Picks -0.111*** -0.021 0.032 0.009
(-3.78) (-0.88) (1.18) (0.39)
Risk Disperse -0.143*** -0.052** -0.032 -0.022
(-4.89) (-2.16) (-1.18) (-0.98)
Risk Focused -0.120*** -0.030 -0.009 0.022
(-4.13) (-1.36) (-0.39) (0.98)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of funds 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746
Number of observations 47934 47934 47934 47934 47934
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.7 reports reports an alternative setting for Table 2.5 where the measure of strategy breadth
is based on the effective number of bets from Meucci (2010).We include time, country and style fixed
effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level .
as an average of the three quarters preceding the financial crisis (2007Q1-2007Q3). Second,
funds are deemed to belong to a specific managerial category (Categorypre-cs) if they were
associated to it for more than 50% of their pre-crisis observations. Finally third, we compute
the cumulative abnormal performance of each fund over the 2007Q4-2008Q4 (alpha-FFcs) to




βc ∗ Categorypre-csc,i +
∑
j=1
βj ∗ Controlspre-csj,i +
∑
k=1
FEk + εi (2.11)
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Table 2.8 reports the results. The category Dispersed Stock picks, is as previously observed
more predictive of future out-performance than the rest of the market. Indeed, the differen-
tial in predicted performance with respect to the Risk Dispersed and Risk Focused is 0.18%
and 0.24% respectively, almost twice the magnitude than the ones previously observed over
the entire sample. However the results are no-longer statistically significant with respect to
Focused Stock picks and only significant at the 10% level compared to Core active funds.
Finally, we conclude that funds which were diversified in their factor exposures while con-
centrated in their stock selection prior to the financial crisis, fared better (or at least as well)
than their peers after its outbreak.
Table 2.8: Active managerial categories and performance: financial crisis.
Alpha-FFcs Alpha-FFcs Alpha-FFcs Alpha-FFcs Alpha-FFcs
I II III IV V
Dispersed Stock Picks 0.126* 0.094 0.179** 0.240***
(1.77) (1.25) (2.39) (3.34)
Core -0.126* -0.032 0.053 0.114*
(-1.77) (-0.43) (0.72) (1.66)
Focused Stock Picks -0.094 0.032 0.085 0.146**
(-1.25) (0.43) (1.05) (1.97)
Risk Disperse -0.179** -0.053 -0.085 0.061
(-2.39) (-0.72) (-1.05) (0.86)
Risk Focused -0.240*** -0.114* -0.146** -0.061
(-3.34) (-1.66) (-1.97) (-0.86)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 654 654 654 654 654
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 2.8 reports an alternative setting for Table 2.5 with a cross-sectional analysis of the funds
performance during the crisis. Controls are taken as an average of the three quarters preceding the
financial crisis (2007Q1-2007Q3). Funds are deemed to belong to a specific managerial category if they
were associated to it for more than 50% of their pre-crisis observations. Finally third, alphaFFcs is




We propose an empirical strategy —based on portfolio holdings data— to analyse the port-
folio concentration of global and domestic European funds. Against this background, the
question we ask is whether funds concentrating their holdings and/or their risk factor expo-
sures are skilled and outperform their peers persistently.
To address this question, we rely on recent developments from the risk budgeting literature
to asses the funds’ strategy breadth, using a principal component analysis on their holdings
returns. Overall, our procedure enables to distinguish —for domestic and global funds alike—
the actual number of factor bets made by each fund, without making any assumptions regard-
ing the factors themselves. Equipped with a dataset of 1,746 European equity mutual funds
from 2003Q1 to 2016Q4, we highlight five managerial categories based on portfolio concentra-
tion characteristics. Namely, funds focusing their strategy (low number of factor bets) while
either spreading their asset allocations or concentrating it (Risk Focused and Focused Stock
picks, respectively), funds broadening their strategy by betting on multiple factors and either
homogeneously or heterogeneously spreading their allocation between assets (Risk Dispersed
and Dispersed Stock picks, respectively) and finally funds neither excessively concentrating
nor diversifying their stock and factor exposures (Core).
Our results show that both measures (stock concentration and strategy breadth) are sig-
nificant positive drivers of risk-adjusted performance when we control for state-of-the-art
characteristics, yet that their interaction has an even greater predictive power. If we break
down the set of mutual funds into five subgroups with respect to their stock and risk concen-
tration profiles, we show that funds concentrating their stock allocation while spreading their
risk exposures are outperforming their peers. This finding is robust to a battery of robustness
checks in which we alter the definition of our main measures. These results highlight that
funds able to spread their risk exposures may increase their portfolio concentration without
worsening portfolio diversification to a point were it would become detrimental. Finally,




SRI Mutual Funds’ Performance and
Investment Universe
“Let’s say you have two equally competent portfolio managers, one of whom can select
investments from an unconstrained universe, but the other is restricted to a subset of that
universe. Our intuition says that the former will outperform the latter” R. Huebscher
(Advisor perspectives), The Disappointing Reality about ESG Fund Performance (2019)
“Andrew Rudd’s inescapable conclusion that the integration of environment, social or
governance (ESG) criteria in investment processes must worsen portfolio diversification
appears to be academic wisdom since nearly thirty years, but is it right?” A.G.F. Hoepner,
Portfolio Diversification and Environmental, Social or Governance Criteria: Must
Responsible Investments Really Be Poorly Diversified? (2010)
3.1 Introduction
The conventional “wisdom” reflected in the above quotes that investment performance should
be adversely affected by imposing (ethical) criteria on portfolio composition has been at the
heart of the debate in the academic world and the financial industry on socially responsible
investments (SRIs)1. The underlying idea behind such a view is that a restricted universe
1The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment defines SRI as “an investment discipline that
considers environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate long-term competitive
financial returns and positive societal impact”(https://www.ussif.org/sribasics). Therefore SRI funds may
include — yet are not restricted to — thematic funds and impact funds. The former invest in equity belonging
to a common theme (as such are usually broader than sectoral funds), the later are funds who solely invest
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might worsen portfolio diversification along with portfolio efficiency (e.g., Markowitz 1952,
Barnett & Salomon 2006, Renneboog et al. 2008b).2 In this study, we challenge this narra-
tive, which, if false, could provide a misleading picture of this segment of the market and
lead to pervasive consequences, such as making end-user investors underestimate what they
should require from their manager compared with the regular strategy, or leading them to
overestimate the sacrifice they should accept in terms of risk-adjusted performance in order
to meet their ethical goals.3
Our main claim is that most fund managers operate, in practice, a restricted list of eligible
assets embedded in their reference benchmark(s). Such a list defines their style, which pro-
vides them with a simple tool to communicate their general strategy to their clients, eases the
performance comparison with relevant peers, and enables them to concentrate their attention
on a set of assets they know well (Brown & Goetzmann 1997, Almazan, Brown, Carlson &
Chapman 2004, Barberis, Shleifer & Wurgler 2005).4 From this perspective, the question we
ask is whether restrictions in an investment universe imposed by sustainability considerations
can be compensated for in other areas. For instance, a manager of an SRI multi-strategy
mutual fund investing in large cap, mid-cap, and small cap alike could eventually have more
stock opportunities than a manager of a purely “unrestricted” (i.e., without SRI restrictions)
small-cap strategy.
This study extends the existing literature on SRI firms (see, among others, Bauer, Koedijk
& Otten 2005, Bauer, Derwall & Otten 2007, Gregory & Whittaker 2007, Renneboog et al.
2008a,b, El Ghoul & Karoui 2017). Since decades, the limit of the available investment
in equity linked to companies whose main goal is to generate a quantifiable beneficial impact on social or
environmental issues. However, given the nature of impact funds, their vast majority are not publicly listed
2According to Markowitz’s seminal work on modern portfolio theory in 1952, a restricted universe such
as an ESG-screened universe, cannot be more diversified than a conventional universe, because the former
is nested in the latter. This reasoning, however relies on the fact that “conventional” universe—in our case
the ones of alternative investments strategies that do not include the SRI nature of assets—are unrestricted,
which is not the case in practice.
3Massive inflows in the SRI industry along with marked changes in investors’ expectations have drawn
increasing attention toward the financial performance of this segment of the market over the years. As noted
in Derwall, Koedijk & Ter Horst (2011), while investors were initially inclined to accept losses in financial
performance in exchange for non-financial utility gains derived from SRI investments, changes have been
observed in this industry. SRIs can be seen now as “a ‘profit-seeking’ approach that accommodates investors
in their pursuit of traditional financial goals.” Evidence on the importance of financial performance in SRIs
can also be found from the early nineties in the survey of Rosen, Sandler & Shani (1991). In this context,
assessing what a good manager who properly accounts for such constraints should be able to deliver to his/her
clients is of utmost interest for market participants.
4As discussed in Almazan et al. (2004), part of the restrictions that face an investment fund—labeled as
non-fundamental restrictions—do not depend on shareholder approval; they capture the set of constraints
that investors and managers consider as necessary to best define the fund’s investment style.
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universe has been pivotal in the discussion on SRI screening. However, sound empirical
evidence on the matter is missing. One reason for this lacuna could be technical: while several
features of investment funds can be directly observed, such as their concentration or portfolio
size (i.e., shareholding), the universe of eligible assets does not share this property—at least
not fully. While not insurmountable, quantifying the investment universe for all funds needs
to be treated with care and requires a few assumptions. We propose to address this issue in
this study by introducing an original methodology to uncover each funds’ investment universe
size. To do so, we exploit granular information about benchmark composition along with
portfolio holdings of funds. The underlying idea is to associate each fund to one or several
benchmarks depending on their actual portfolio holdings. The set of associated benchmarks
defines their style (e.g., US growth and Large Cap Financial) and constitutes the first step of
our methodology. Once de facto styles are identified for each fund, we aggregate the entire
set of assets included in each associated benchmark to recover the investment universe. For
example, a relatively simple case is one of a mutual fund investing 100% of its assets in a “US
growth” benchmark. Here, we would consider that its universe could be approximated by the
number of stocks included in the US growth benchmark. The picture is more blurred when
funds do rely on multiple benchmarks. Simple aggregation is an option, but it could lead to
misleading cases. For instance, if a fund holds 99% in a small benchmark and only a 1% in
a large benchmark, considering all assets populating the latter as being part of its universe
could inflate the actual number of assets this fund is actually considering for investing. Our
design deals with this caveat by considering how important a benchmark is for a fund. Such
information is subsequently featured in the aggregation process wherein more weight is given
to assets attached to the main benchmark; inversely, lower importance is attached to those
in the secondary benchmarks. Eventually, we obtain a novel and simple measure of a style-
based investment universe, labeled IU Score, available for each fund at each time period.
Our empirical analysis builds on a micro-level dataset of 2,039 US equity mutual funds for
the period 2012Q4-2018Q4. All data are collected from Morningstar. Morningstar is con-
sidered among the most reliable and critical sources of information for the mutual fund
industry (Del Guercio & Tkac 2008).5 The extant literature is rife with anecdotes or ev-
idence of how important its information is to professionals. Ben-David, Li, Rossi & Song
(2019), for instance, emphasize the sound recognition of Morningstar’s expertise and its rep-
utation as an independent agency, noting that “investors [...] take Morningstar’s advice at
5The reputation of Morningstar is well illustrated in Del Guercio & Tkac (2008) by the following quote:
“[T]he brand that has emerged as dominant in the 1990s is not Fidelity, Putnam or even Merrill Lynch but
instead is Morningstar. Pozen & Crane, The Mutual Fund Business (1998), p. 75”
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face value.” We retrieve three key ingredients for our empirical analysis from Morningstar.
First, Morningstar classifies US equities into common benchmark categories based on their
size tilt (small-cap, mid-cap, or large-cap), value tilt (value, blend, or growth) (these two
categories constitute the so-called Morningstar “style-box”), and industry tilt (Communica-
tions, Consumer Defensive, Consumer Cyclical, Energy Limited Partnership, Equity Energy,
Equity Precious Metals, Financial, Health, Industrials, Infrastructure, Natural Resources,
Real Estate, Technology, and Utilities Miscellaneous Sector).6 We possess holdings for all
these benchmarks at the quarterly frequency. Second, we collect the fund’s stock holdings
for all our mutual funds at a quarterly frequency. By comparing the holdings of a mutual
fund with the holdings of each benchmark, we can connect each fund to one or multiple
benchmarks and recover their complete investment style. By doing so, we define styles that
are free from self-specified benchmark manipulation (Sensoy 2009).7 Our matching algorithm
and similarity-based weighted scheme to aggregate benchmarks constituents allow us to re-
cover the full distribution of funds with respect to the size of their universe. Large-universe
(LU) mutual funds and Small-universe (SU) mutual funds are located respectively above
and below the median value. Third, Morningstar introduced to the public in 2016 a novel
asset-weighted composite sustainable portfolio score8 (Sustainability score) with a funds’
coverage starting in 2012 (see, for instance, Candelon, Hasse & Lajaunie 2018, Ammann,
Bauer, Fischer & Müller 2019 for recent studies using Morningstar’s sustainable investment
metrics).9 We flag as SRI the top 10% and the rest as Conventional. We thus have four cat-
egories: SRILU , SRISU , ConvLU , and ConvSU .
10 Equipped with our sample of mutual funds
segmented in subcategories, we apply standard regression to explain the Carhart (1997) four-
factor alpha with respect to our categories and state-of-the-art controls (Cremers & Petajisto
2009). Eventually, as the performance of the funds could also be a driver of its migration
toward the SRI strategy, we also test for the presence of endogeneity.
6Sectors (Kacperczyk et al. 2005), size, along with book-to-market ratio (Hoberg et al. 2017) are the most
standard segmentation criteria. Morningstar also proposes categories based on geographical location (e.g.,
World, Foreign, and Europe). These categories are not relevant in our case, as we focus on only US stocks.
Among academic papers referring to the Morningstar style categories, see Brown & Goetzmann (1997) or
Almazan et al. (2004).
7Overall, more than 87% of the funds’ portfolio holdings in our sample are included in the Morningstar
benchmarks.
8As explained above, SRI funds are characterised by a double investment objective, on the one hand
taking into account ESG criteria, and on the other hand providing financial returns for their client. Yet,
the degree with which each objective is pursued may vary between funds, thus we argue than focusing on
Morningstar sustainable score offers a good opportunity to highlight truly SRI driven funds and test whether
they are able provide financial returns on par with more conventional funds managers.
9Note that Ammann et al. (2019) use the Morningstar globes, which is a version of the score slightly
different from ours.
10We alter our algorithm in different ways to test the robustness of our results in section 5.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 59
Our study contributes to the literature on asset management in general and to the one on
SRI in particular. Three features particularly stand out.
First, we develop a novel measure of investment universe based on investment styles that
accommodates single and multi strategies. This measure enables to sort funds by the size
of their universe. Unlike portfolio’s size or portfolio’s concentration for which we can find
several measures in the literature (Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Brands et al. 2005, Fulkerson
& Riley 2019), serious quantification of investment universe has been so far overlooked in
academic studies to our knowledge. Our style-based approach is simple and flexible. It can
be applied to any sort of funds for which we possess information on portfolio holdings.
Second, we obtain important insights from our results. As discussed in the literature, the
effect of investment restrictions in financial performance is contrasted. On the one hand, it
could worsen portfolio diversification. On the other hand, it helps managers better screen
their assets, thus increasing the chance to size good opportunities and target companies
with more sustainable profitability and better long-term prospects (Clark, Feiner & Viehs
2015, El Ghoul & Karoui 2017). One or the other effects might dominate, depending on a
number of features among which the actual size of the universe—for example, with a very
restricted universe, the adverse effects of poor diversification might dominate the screening
effect. Separating SRI mutual funds and Conventional mutual funds by the size of their
universe, we find that only SRI mutual funds with the smaller universe perform worse than
Conventional funds. In accordance, our results show that, while the inclusion of socially
responsible criteria into investment processes likely restricts the number of eligible assets
with the risk of worsening portfolio diversification, such restrictions can be loosened by
adopting a style benchmark strategy that increases the number of available assets (e.g.,
multiple benchmark strategies or single benchmark with a large benchmark). This result
is important, as its shows that SRI active investment managers would be well advised to
consider a style that relies on a large range of assets in their portfolio management to minimize
the side effect of restrictions imposed by SRI principals. From the end-user perspective, we
provide empirical evidence to feed the debate on what risk-adjusted performance investors
would require consistently in pursuit of ethical goals. These findings are robust to a series of
robustness check.
Third, we propose an novel approach based on instrumental variable to explore the causal re-
lationship between sustainability of mutual funds and their financial performance. As further
developed below, studies explicitly tackling this issue are rather scarce. Our instruments pass
both the usual relevance and exogeneity tests. Eventually, we find no evidence of endogeneity
of SRI categories in our data.
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The remaining paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize the literature.
In section 3, we describe our methodology and data sources. Section 4 presents our results.
Robustness analysis is performed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work follows three strands of the literature. In what follows, we review the studies that
best relate to our research.
We first consider the broad literature on portfolio policy constraints (Koski & Pontiff 1999,
Deli & Varma 2002, Almazan et al. 2004). Within this body of research, Almazan et al.
(2004) explore the link between fund returns and a policy constraint index constructed as
the equally weighted sum of restrictions regarding a fund’s ability to use leverage (e.g., bor-
rowing of money, margin purchases, and short selling), its ability to use derivatives (i.e.,
writing or investing in options on equities and writing or investing in stock index futures),
and its ability to invest in illiquid assets (i.e., investments in restricted securities). Based on
the data of 9,525 US domestic equity funds from between 1994 and 2000, the authors find
no differences in fund performance stemming from the level of investment policy restriction.
Other contributions documenting alternative types of restrictions include Koski & Pontiff
(1999) and Deli & Varma (2002) for the use of derivative securities or Clarke, De Silva &
Thorley (2002) on position size and portfolio turnover effect. By focusing on SRI invest-
ment funds that attract an increasing amount of flows from investors while having to deal
with restricted universe, we extend this line research. Our work also departs from existing
contributions—We confront two types of restriction, namely, the one on socially responsible
constrictions and the one on investment style, in order to assess whether the impact of one
restriction can be alleviated by relaxing the other. To our knowledge, our study is the first
to document whether the reduction in eligible assets from the adoption of a specific criteria
or legal issues can be offset by the adoption of a style associated with a large universe.
Our study also contributes to the expending list of academic works on SRI mutual fund
performance that test whether fund managers are “paying the price for ethics”. Here, empir-
ical evidence is mixed so far.11 Some studies fail to report any statistical difference between
risk-adjusted returns of the SRI and conventional mutual funds (e.g., Bauer et al. 2005,
Barnett & Salomon 2006, Gregory & Whittaker 2007, Meziani 2014, Dolvin, Fulkerson &
11Our main interest is to contrast the performance of high SRI funds with other funds conditionally on
their universe. One line of enquiry in the SRI literature also explores the performance of “sin”, that is, low
SRI funds or stocks (see, for instance, Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk & ter Horst 2015, Richey 2016, Trinks &
Scholtens 2017). For the sake of parsimony, we do not review this literature, as it fits less with our purpose.
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Krukover 2019). Meanwhile, other contributions such as Renneboog et al. (2008a) find weak
evidence that socially responsible funds under-perform compared with other funds, especially
for the period between 1993 and 2003, based on a large set of funds across the world. Such
under-performance is particularly strong in normal time, while SRIs may outperform in time
of market crisis (Nofsinger & Varma 2014). Evidence of under-performance also exists for
stocks (Ciciretti, Dalo & Dam 2019). More recently, El Ghoul & Karoui (2017) use data
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database along with the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database to
construct a sample of mutual fund corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores by aggregat-
ing stock-level scores. Relying on a sample of 2,168 US equity funds between 2003 and 2011,
they provide support for Renneboog et al. (2008a). That is, an increase in the level of CSR is
negatively related to the fund’s risk-adjusted performance. Our study extends these previous
findings. First, we use Morningstar information on the sustainability score of mutual funds.
By doing so, we can use an external score for the regression analysis. Second, our results
tend to reconcile previous findings: We fail to observe significant difference between the SRI
mutual funds taken as a whole and their Conventional counterparts. However, we show that
SRI mutual funds do not form a homogeneous group, as those following a style associated to
the smallest universe under-perform against their peers.
The final corpus of literature explores the causal relationship between sustainability of mu-
tual funds and other mutual funds’ features. Studies explicitly tackling this issue are rather
scarce. For instance, Bauer et al. (2005), Renneboog et al. (2008a), and El Ghoul & Karoui
(2017) remain silent about the identification issue stemming from the risk of reverse causal-
ity whereby financial performance influences the adoption of socially responsible restrictions.
Renneboog et al. (2008a) use panel data at the monthly frequency to estimate the link be-
tween risk-adjusted returns and ethical funds. They disentangle the effect of various screen-
ing activities, such as the intensity of screening activity—for example, Number Sin Screens,
Number Ethical Screens, and Number Social Screens—or the intent to influence corporate
behavior through direct engagement. One dummy variable depicts whether a fund is an SRI
or not. While the set of controls are time-varying and lagged by one period, the screening
activity and SRI variables enter in the model as time-invariant over the 1991–2003 period.
Proceeding this way likely mitigates the endogeneity problem. However, it also leads to er-
roneously portraying the funds’ behavior, as screening activity generally evolves over time.
By contrast, El Ghoul & Karoui (2017) exploit time variations in CSR and SRI practices.
First, they show that the CSR score is explained by contemporaneous financial performance.
Next, using a panel of yearly data, they lag all regressors, with CSR score and SRI dummy
by one period, to explain the funds’ alpha. Replacing a suspected simultaneously deter-
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mined explanatory variable with its lagged value is a common practice in applied research.
However, as discussed in the literature (see, Reed 2015), it might not be sufficient to rule
out an endogeneity bias when the dependent variable displays serial correlation. Without
further evidence on data properties, some of the existing results on the link between sus-
tainable strategy and financial performance should, therefore, be taken with care. A more
sophisticated approach to deal with this issue is proposed by Hartzmark & Sussman (2019),
who explore the problem in depth. In 2016, sustainability ratings provided by Morningstar
changed its manner to provide information on the sustainability score to the public opting for
“globes” based on percentile. This shift, external to any fund-specific features, is considered
to have dramatically improved the clarity of SRI ratings and their adoption by the market.
In a quasi-experimental setting, Hartzmark & Sussman (2019) use this discontinuity as a
shock to identify that the link between mutual funds ratings and funds’ flows is caused by
changes in rating.
Ideally, we would have an exogenous event in our study that induced a change in the SRI
score, without directly affecting the risk-adjusted performance. We do not have such an
event. However, we propose an original instrumental approach to test if our conclusions are
robust to this caveat.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data and sample
Quarterly data on mutual fund holdings are collected from the Morningstar Direct database.
Over the past two decades, this source has been widely used in academic literature (see
among others, Brown & Goetzmann 1997, Almazan et al. 2004, Del Guercio & Tkac 2008,
Hartzmark & Sussman 2019). Morningstar is free from the survivor bias, and provides very
comprehensive access to fund- and industry-level data. For the purpose of illustration, we can
emphasize the disclosure of portfolio holdings, but also a large set of auxiliary information
such as the Morningstar style benchmarks—the so-called “style box”—and Morningstar rat-
ings, which are closely monitored by investors (Ammann et al. 2019, Hartzmark & Sussman
2019, Ben-David et al. 2019, Ciciretti et al. 2019). We restrict our analysis to active equity
mutual funds domiciled in the US and investing in the US market12. Imposing this screening
criteria keeps the sample relatively more homogeneous. It should also facilitate the recon-
12As done in Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Cremers & Petajisto (2009), Amihud & Goyenko (2013).
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struction of the mutual funds’ universe by limiting the set of available assets to US stocks13.
We start with 3,172 US equity mutual funds14 for the 2012Q4–2018Q4 period. We then
apply standard filters (Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Ferreira et al. 2013, Kacperczyk et al. 2014)
to meet our screening criteria. Specifically, we exclude fund of funds, index tracking funds,
and equity mutual funds with less than two quarters of holdings observations. Furthermore,
at each quarter—similarly to Cremers & Petajisto (2009)—equity mutual funds with less
than US$ 1 million of asset under management and holding less than 60% of their portfolio
in equity are dropped. Finally, we exclude funds for which no sustainability information is
available (see section 3.3) and obtain a final sample of 2,039 distinct US equity mutual funds.
We collect from the same source other usual characteristics of mutual funds, such as funds’
gross and net monthly returns which will be used to compute the funds quarterly abnormal
performances. We also retrieve their quarterly total net asset (TNA) and sustainability
score. The sustainability mandate (i.e., if the fund includes in its prospectus sustainability
in its purpose) is also extracted. We further extract for each equity mutual fund the annual
net expense ratio (NER) and turnover ratio15 as well as the funds’ age measured in years
since inception of the oldest share. The missing values of NER are completed as in Elton
et al. (2013) by subtracting the monthly gross return of our funds from their monthly net
return, then retrieving their quarterly average. Regarding the turnover ratio, we complete
each missing quarter by taking the percentage of a fund’s TNA represented by the total
number of assets purchased or sold between two periods, whichever is less (El Ghoul &
Karoui 2017). With these data, we compute the fund flow, as in Cremers & Petajisto (2009),
as the percentage growth in total TNA between two consecutive quarters, as well as their
volatility over the previous 12 months.
3.3.2 Measuring mutual funds universe
A critical feature of the analysis pertains to the measurement of the mutual funds’ universe.
The universe of investment corresponds to the whole set of assets that each fund considers as
candidates consistently with its general strategy when building and re-balancing its portfolio.
Generally, it does not correspond to the entire set of tradable assets in the market (i.e., “mar-
ket portfolio”), but to a subset. Typically, it encompasses all of the securities in a particular
asset class or of a fraction of the asset class based on additional segregation parameters. The
13Fund with less than 50% of their portfolio matching the entire stock universe of all US styles benchmarks
are not considered
14When multiple shares are available, we only consider the “oldest share” identified by Morningstar to
avoid redundancy, as in Porter & Trifts (2014)
15We then divide both ratios by four in order to obtain quarterly data.
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resulting “restricted” universe defines the style of an institution, which plays a critical role
in the mutual fund industry (Brown & Goetzmann 1997). As discussed in Almazan et al.
(2004), for instance, part of the restrictions that face an investment fund capture the set
of constraints that investors and managers consider as necessary to best define the fund’s
investment trademark. The style provides them with a simple tool to communicate their gen-
eral strategy to their clients, eases performance comparisons with relevant peers, and helps
concentrate their attention to a set of assets they know well. The style classification of equity
is often defined along four dimensions (Brown & Goetzmann 1997, Kacperczyk et al. 2005,
Hoberg et al. 2017): (i) size, (ii) book-to-market ratio, (iii) industry, and (iv) geographic
location. Typically, stocks from firms of similar size are placed in the same style group. The
same applies for other common segmentation criteria, such as fundamental characteristics
(e.g., value vs. growth stocks) or industries (e.g., financial vs. industrial). Accordingly, the
whole set of equities in the market can be allocated into relatively homogeneous groups of
assets, namely, benchmarks wherein each fund will consider making its selection to build
its portfolio. Investments into benchmarks are not exclusive. Some managers may opt for a
single-benchmark style (e.g., value), while other rely on multiple-benchmark style (e.g., large-
cap/value or small-cap/value), spreading their investment across various groups to increase
their diversification, for instance.
Against this background, we propose an original approach to recover the universe of each
fund included in our sample across time. To do so, we exploit granular information about
benchmark composition along with portfolio holdings of funds. The underlying idea of our
approach is to associate each fund with one or several benchmarks, depending on their actual
portfolio holdings. We call them the “associated benchmarks.” Then, we aggregate the
number of assets included in all associated benchmarks. The weights used in the aggregation
step depend on how much important a benchmark is in the fund’s portfolio. Lastly, we
ultimately aim to create categories of large versus small universes for which recovering a
ranking of funds is sufficient. For instance, we do not need to know that fund A and fund
B do have a universe of 400 assets and 300 assets, respectively, for instance, but just that A
possesses a larger universe than B. In accordance, we actually do not have to estimate the
exact size of their universe, but only recover proxies good enough to preserve the relative
positioning of each fund in the ranking. As we cannot rule out the presence of noise in our
metric, we propose to test the robustness of our findings to alternative approaches for the
classification.
Formally, at each quarter, we measure the investment universe for each fund as the total
number of stocks held by the style benchmarks associated with a fund, scaled by the overlap
between the fund portfolio and the benchmarks, and label this variable IU Scoref,t. Thus,





where N16 is the number of shares held by benchmark b at time t and wf,b,t is the weight
attached to benchmark b for fund f at time t (see below).
To compute our measure, we need to break the entire set of tradeable equities into homo-
geneous groups (i.e., benchmarks, b) and quantify them (i.e., count the number of available
assets, Nb,t). A natural and simple way to assign individual stock to meaningful style bench-
marks is to use Morningstar-style categories. Since almost three decades, these categories
have been widely monitored by the industry Haslem (2009, 2017).
Morningstar categories emerged in the early nineties amid suspicion of strategic manipula-
tion of self-declared styles by mutual funds. To provide a more accurate assessment of actual
investment style, the Chicago-based firm developed investment categories with a list of their
components (i.e., associated assets) to be matched with mutual funds’ holdings in order to
recover the actual investment strategy of mutual funds as opposed to the one stated in their
prospectus. The so-called “equity style box,” for instance, consists of a 3x3 grid based on
the market capitalization as well as growth and value factors, which allows traded securi-
ties to be grouped into nine “investment-style” categories: large cap value, large cap blend,
large cap growth, mid-cap value, mid-cap blend, mid-cap growth, of value/blend/growth
and small/mid/large-cap. These categories can be applied to both stocks and funds.17 In
addition to these nine categories, Morningstar also defines categories by sectors: Communi-
cations, Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Defensive, Energy Limited Partnership, Energy, Pre-
cious Metals, Financial, Healthcare, Industrials, Infrastructure, Miscellaneous Sector, Nat-
ural Resources, Real Estate, Technology, and Utilities. We do not consider geographical
dimension, as our sample is restricted to US equities. In total, we consider 26 Morningstar
categories or benchmarks b. These benchmarks embed 3,826 stocks on average per period
that is nearly 100% of the U.S. investable equity market. The style attributes of individual
stocks are then used to identify the style classification of mutual funds and eventually recover
16As explained below, we apply a small correction to our data. As benchmarks are not exclusive and could
have some assets in common, we make sure that an asset appears only one time in a fund’s universe.
17Note that growth and value categories are common to both stocks and funds. Growth funds are deemed
so if the investment is in growth stocks. For the blend category, the situation is slightly different. Stocks
wherein neither the value nor the growth characteristics dominate are labeled core. For funds, the category
next to value and growth is the blend style. It can be a mixture of growth, value stocks, as well as core
stocks. However, in practice, as stated in Morningstar documentation, it “mostly [constituted by ] core
stocks” www.morningstar.be/be/news/article.aspx). For the sake of simplicity, we keep the term “blend” to
characterize both stocks and funds.
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their universe. To match each fund with its associated benchmarks, we measure the overlap
of the funds’ portfolio relative to each benchmark. To do so, we use an overlap’s measure
based on the Manhattan distance, following Cremers & Petajisto (2009), for constructing
their Active Share (AS ) score18. Formally, we measure the proximity of each fund “f ” with
any benchmark “b” at each quarter “t” as follows19:





|ωf,i,t − ωb,i,t|) (3.2)
where M is the sum of stocks in either the portfolio of f or the benchmark b at time t.
ωf,i,t is the share of stock i in the portfolio of f and ωb,i,t is its share in the benchmark
b. This measure ranges from 0% to 100% (if no short-selling is allowed), where a score of
100% indicates full overlap between the fund and its benchmark portfolio. We proceed by
sorting the benchmarks for each fund by the level of overlap—from the closer benchmark
to the more distant. We pick the first one and count its number of assets N1,t. To identify
the number of assets increasing the size of the universe in the second benchmark, we have
to monitor any potential redundancy of assets across benchmarks (i.e., assets appearing in
multiple benchmarks). We remove assets from the others benchmarks which were common
to the first one and count the number of remaining assets N2,t included in the second match.
We repeat this procedure as we go down in the list until all benchmarks have been covered.
If a benchmark has zero stocks left in common with the fund (after the iterative cleaning),
it is dropped. All remaining benchmarks are deemed “associated benchmarks.” They all
define the style of the fund at different degrees. As a consequence, all their assets can be
considered consistent with the fund’s strategy and, as such, part of its investment universe.
All associated benchmarks are probably not of the same importance for a fund and so should
be the weights attached to the benchmarks’ constituents when computing the universe. For
instance, a fund could hold 99% in a small benchmark and only a 1% in a large benchmark.
Weighting assets populating both benchmark as the same could inflate its universe. We
control for the importance of a benchmark in the aggregation step by weighting each asset
with our overlap measure wf,b,t. Note that the weighting step makes it difficult to interpret
the value of the score, which should be viewed as a metric to sort mutual funds by the size
of their universe.
18AS is a measure of dissimilarity between a fund and a benchmark
19In our study, we focus on the equity portfolio of mutual-funds; if the portfolio is not made of a 100% of
equity, we re-scale its weights to sum to 100%
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3.3.3 Uncovering SRI-driven funds
We use the Morningstar Sustainability Rating as our source of data on sustainability. The
rating enables us to assess a fund’s level of sustainability and, thus, compare it to others. The
score provided by Morningstar is holdings-based, that is, it reflects the sustainability of the
firms held in a mutual fund’s portfolio. Specifically, the rating stems from the aggregation
of the normalized firms’ ESG scores and controversy score. The former reflects to what
extend a firm successfully manages ESG risks and opportunities relative to their industry
peers. It ranges from 0 to 100. The later tracks involvement in ESG-related incidents that
may negatively affect the environment or society, and its related risk for the company itself.
The controversy score ranges from 0 to 100. Both scores are provided by Sustainalytics, a
global leader in sustainability research and analysis in the industry. With firm-level data,
Morningstar uses the asset-weighted sum of the difference between the ESG score and the




ωi(ESGi − Controversyi) (3.3)
where ESGi and Controversyi are the industry normalized firms’ ESG score and controversy
score, respectively, and n is the number of assets composing the portfolio20 and ωi its share.
The score is updated monthly based on the most recent company data from Sustainalytics.
In our context, the Morningstar Sustainability Rating has a number of advantages. First,
Morningstar emerged rapidly as a recognized source of information in the literature on mutual
funds’ sustainable investment practices (Ammann et al. 2019, Hartzmark & Sussman 2019,
Ceccarelli, Ramelli & Wagner 2019). Second, it covers a very large part of the market over a
reasonably long period of time. In general, most of the funds are rated by the end of 2012.
More than 90% of the US equity mutual funds included in our sample did have a sustainability
rating from Morningstar. Third, the construction of the score is fully transparent. Fourth,
it provides an external measure of sustainability that could easily and directly be used by
many researchers, thereby avoiding the need to develop a new measure, as in El Ghoul &
Karoui (2017). Based on the sustainability score, we break our sample of mutual funds into
categories. To do so, we rank all mutual funds at each quarter according to their score. The
20A fund receives either an ESG or controversy score, if this information is present for at least 50% of a
portfolio’s assets under management. The scored assets’ weights are then re-scaled to 100% (for further details
on the computation of the score, see https://s21.q4cdn.com/198919461/files/doc downloads/press kits/2016/
Morningstar-Sustainability-Rating-Methodology.pdf
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mutual funds in the top 10th decile are labeled “SRI ” and the rest “Conventional.” The 10%
threshold is consistent with the proportion of self-declared “socially conscious” mutual funds
in their prospectus.21 Eventually, we combine this information with the one on the size of
the universe to create our main variables of interest. Taking each group separately, we rank
them with respect to their IU Score. Large-universe (LU) mutual funds and Small-universe
(SU) mutual funds are located respectively above and below the median values. We then
have four categories: SRI LU, SRI SU, Conv LU, and Conv SU.
3.3.4 Modeling (un)conditional effect of SRIs on mutual funds’
performance
Our framework enables us to formulate two testable hypotheses:
• H1: Are SRI principals detrimental to mutual funds’ financial performance?
• H2: Are restrictions in an investment universe imposed by sustainability considerations
compensated for in other areas by adopting styles associated with large universes?
To do so, we estimate a panel regression forecasting the four-factor abnormal returns αi,t+1
based on the following model22:
αf,t+1 = β0 + βLU ∗ SRILUf,t + βSU ∗ SRISUf,t + δSU ∗ ConvLUf,t + δLU ∗ ConvSUf,t
+
∑
i=1 βi ∗ Controlsi,f,t +Qt + Sf + εf,t+1
(3.4)
where SRILUf,t is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if a fund f at time t is SRI-
driven and with a IU Score above the median, and 0 otherwise; SRISU is a dummy variable
that takes on the value 1 if a fund is SRI-driven and with a IU Score below the median
and 0 otherwise; ConvLU is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the funds is not
SRI-driven and with a IU Score above the median, and 0 otherwise; ConvSU is a dummy
21We count 188 self-declared socially conscious funds in our sample to be compared to a total of 2,039
mutual funds, that is, ∼ 10.8%
22We compute the funds’ risk-adjusted returns by estimating the traditional four-factor alpha (Carhart
1997) with rolling windows of 24 months (complete return information over the window is required) moving by
one quarter. The monthly US factors and risk-free rate are retrieved from the Kenneth French online library
(available at: https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html).Using the four-
factor alpha allows to ensure that the performance of SRI funds are not driven by their exposure to specific
equity characteristics (e.g. growth and large capitalisation styles. For comparison purpose, we also imple-
mented the 5-factor alpha (Fama & French 2010) as in Joliet & Titova (2018) and no substantial differences
were observed (results are available upon request)
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variable that takes on the value 1 if the funds is not SRI-driven and with a IU Score below
the median, and 0 otherwise.
The first hypothesis, H1, corresponds to the unconditional effect of the SRI on mutual funds’
performance. To test it, we impose βLU = βSU , that is, the influence of the SRI on financial
performance is homogeneous across SRI mutual funds. In addition, we set δLU = δSU = 0 to
compare it to all Conventional mutual funds and avoid perfect collinearity.
The second hypothesis, H2, corresponds to the conditional effect of the SRI on mutual funds’
performance with respect to the size of the universe. To test it, we relax the homogeneity
assumption and freely estimate βLU and βSU . To avoid perfect collinearity, we set one pa-
rameter among δLU , δSU , βLU , and βSU equal to zero. The selected parameter provides the
base effect against which the three other coefficients should be compared.
Our goal is to identify the marginal impact of the adoption of SRI principals on financial
performance along with the role that style benchmarks can play in mitigating the resulting
restrictions on eligible assets. Both features could be correlated with others traits of mutual
funds, such has their age or their size, which have been shown to be significant determinants
of performance in the literature (see, for instance, Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Ferreira et al.
2013, Amihud & Goyenko 2013). To isolate our effects, we add a large set of controls. Follow-
ing the literature Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Amihud & Goyenko 2013, we include the funds
size, computed as the natural logarithm of their TNA (LN(TNA)), as well as its squared
value (LN(TNA)2), the natural logarithm of the funds age (LN(Age)), and the natural log-
arithm of the number of assets composing the portfolio (LN(Assets)). We further add the
funds’ flows (Flow) as well as their volatility over the previous 12 months (Flow-sd), turnover
ratio (Turnover), (NER), and the R-square (R2) of the four-factor performance regression
as a stock selectivity proxy (see Amihud & Goyenko 2013). Our final controls is the funds’
volatility return (Vol) computed as the standard deviation of monthly returns over the pre-
vious 24 months. Eventually, in line with El Ghoul & Karoui (2017), we add time (Qt) as
well as style (Sf ) fixed effects. As usually done in the literature, we lag all controls by one
period and winsorize the continuous variable at the 1% level23.





Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of our main variables. The mutual funds included in
our sample are, on average, worth US$ 1,71 billion and are 17 years old. The average quarterly
net flows is negative (-0,12%) with a standard deviation of 12.38%, reflecting a slowdown in
this segment of the industry over our sample period, but also marked heterogeneity. The
mean of the quarterly net abnormal performance is negative (-0,49%), consistent with the
literature on active management having documented its inability to create value for investors
on average. The average quarterly turnover is around 15%, while their annual NER is about
1%. The fund SRI score ranges from 28.01 to 58.33, with an average of ∼ 45.88. The typical
active manager holds 188 stocks over four main associated benchmarks but invests more than
40% in its main benchmark (best match). The R2 of the four-factor alpha regression is at
the median equal to 93.28% indicating that most of the average fund’s returns variability
is explained by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Turning to the investment universe
score, we observe an average value of 228 with a minimum value of 31 and a maximum value
of 477. The unweighted measure of investment universe24 does not account for fact that all
associated benchmarks are not of equal importance for a fund. However, its value is easier to
interpret. The mean of stocks consistent with funds strategies is of 1,556 with a maximum
of 3,201 stocks.
24We select the benchmark with which the portfolio has at least 5% in common and sum their total number
of unique assets
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Mean Median Sd Min Max
Age (Years) 17.40 15.75 13.44 0.50 70.08
Alpha 4-factor (% Quarterly) -0.49 -0.44 0.60 -4.53 3.057
Flow (% TNA) -0.12 -0.63 12.38 -12.48 29.21
Flowsd 3.72 1.56 7.75 0.16 63.84
#Assets 118 70 180 20 1466
NER (%) 1.00 0.98 0.3440 0.20 2.42
R2 (%) 89.41 93.28 12.41 28.43 99.38
Styles best match (%) 42.07 42.13 13.9 11.49 78.76
Styles covered 3.7 4 1.65 7 1
Sustainability score 45.88 46.17 2.97 28.01 58.33
TNA ($ bn) 1.71 0.42 3.55 0.002 21.85
Turnover (%) 14.67 11.50 12.08 0.50 77.25
IU Score 228 218 107 31 477
IU Score (unweighted) 1584 1526 727 161 3201
Vol (%) 3.53 3.41 0.89 2.03 6.96
Note: Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables over the 2012Q4 to 2018Q4 pe-
riod. More precisely it reports the mean, median, standard deviation minimum and maximum of the
funds’s age expressed in years, the risk adjusted performance (alpha 4-factor) over the quarter and
its associated R2, the TNA in billion dollar (TNA), the flows and flows’ volatility over the last 12
months, the % of the funds belonging to its best match style, the number of styles covering 80% of the
portfolio and accounting for at least 5% of the portfolio individually (Styles covered),the number of
assets composing the portfolio (Assets), the (NER) as well as the turnover ratio, the volatility of the
funds returns over the past 24 months, the sustainability score and the funds weighted and unweighted
investment universe score (IU Score).
In Table 3.2, we report summary statistics regarding benchmarks. We observe that bench-
marks are constituted, on average, of 126 stocks, for the smallest, and 549 for the largest.
Next, we look at the allocation of funds across benchmarks. We consider each time the main
benchmark of each fund that is the one with the greatest match. The average number of
funds is around 185 for the equity style box styles and 22 for US sectors. We can notice
that SRI and Conventional funds are distributed rather similarly across benchmarks (with a
correlation of 75.95%) with, for both, a majority of investments made in large caps.
72 3.4. RESULTS
Table 3.2: Mutual funds’ styles descriptive statistics
Name Type #Funds #Assets %Conventional %SRI
Communication US Sector equity 4 301 0,28 0.00
Consumer Cyclical US Sector equity 8 292 0,55 0,72
Consumer Defensive US Sector equity 10 248 0,52 1,92
Energy Limited Partnership US Sector equity 13 126 0,84 0,99
Equity Energy US Sector equity 21 309 1,40 1,38
Equity Precious Metals US Sector equity 3 194 0,11 0,63
Financial US sector equity 29 349 1,99 1,58
Health US sector equity 31 260 1,61 6,23
Industrials US sector equity 6 321 0,28 1,27
Infrastructure US sector equity 0 360 0.00 0,00
Large Blend US Equity 106 267 6,45 12,34
Large Growth US Equity 308 325 21,74 11,63
Large Value US Equity 394 343 25,59 33,39
Mid-Cap Blend US Equity 53 457 3,88 0,79
Mid-Cap Growth US Equity 127 419 9,40 0,88
Mid-Cap Value US Equity 100 484 7,37 1,10
Miscellaneous Sector US Sector equity 3 549 0,14 0,76
Natural Resources US sector equity 8 524 0,54 0,63
Real Estate US sector equity 54 197 2,18 15,48
Small Blend US Equity 46 408 3,46 0.00
Small Growth US Equity 64 447 4,79 0.00
Small Value US Equity 44 456 3,25 0.63
Technology US sector equity 57 455 3,44 6,96
Utilities US sector equity 3 334 0,13 0.63
— Correlation : 75.95%
Note: Table 3.2 reports the average number of funds associated to each styles (according to their best
match) at each quarter throughout our sample, as well as the styles’ type and the style average number
of assets. %Conventional and %SRI represent the average proportion of each type of funds represented in
each style. The styles are determined by Morningstar to categorize funds with similar holdings together
and create meaningful categories for the investors. Each style as an associated benchmark for which we
have complete holdings information. We have a total of 24 US styles, of which 15 are based on sectors
and 9 on stocks capitalization. Infrastructure is included in our calculations, even though no funds in our
sample uses it as their main style, they might still allocate part of their remaining wealth to it.
Table 3.3 reports additional features. We observe that SRI funds tend to be slightly younger
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and larger than their Conventional counterparts. They hold significantly less stocks and
focus on a lower number of benchmarks. They exhibit more stable flows and a higher degree
of stocks selectivity, as expressed by their lower R2. Conversely, Conventional funds display,
on average, a much higher turnover ratio. Eventually, without controlling for additional
features, SRI funds exhibit higher performance than Conventional ones.
Table 3.3: Characteristics of SRI vs Conventional funds
Conv SRI SRI-Conv t-statistic
Age (Years) 17.43 16.99 -0.44* -1.7
Alpha 4-factor (% Quarterly) -0.51 -0.32 0.19** 2.2
Flow (% TNA) -0.30 0.37 0.67 1.4
Flowsd 0.037 0.036 0.001* -1.7
#Assets 124 65 -59*** -23
NER (%) 0.9997 1.0025 0.0028 0.81
R2 (%) 90.15 82.65 -7.5*** -8
Styles Best match (%) 41.47 47.48 6.01*** 6.7
Styles covered 3.91 3.69 -0.022*** -3.4
Sustainability score 45.48 49.72 4.14*** 10
TNA ($ bn) 1.67 2.10 0.43*** 3.1
Turnover (%) 15.01 10.97 -4.04*** -10
IU Score 235 204 -31*** -7.1
IU Score (unweighted) 1584 1316 -268*** -7.3
Vol (%) 3.56 3.33 -0.23 -1.2
Note: Table 3.3 reports the average level of our main variable relatively to their main category of funds
(SRI vs Conventional). Variables are defined as in Table 2.2. Each quarter we flag the funds having the
best sustainability score (top 10%) as SRI funds and the rest as Conventional (Conv), then we aggregate
at each quarter the fund’s variable for each category which we display in the first and second column.
The third column displays the difference in means between the variable stemming from SRI funds and
Conventional ones. The last column reports the t-statistics for the differences in means.
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3.4.2 Unconditional effect of SRI on mutual funds’ performance
Before gauging the relationship between funds’ performance and their sustainability score,
Table 3.4 reports the coefficient of the quarterly panel regression of funds’ risk adjusted
performance on state-of-the-art characteristics. In the table, we indicate both the value of
the coefficients and the t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. In its
lower part, we include whether or not we use time and/or category fixed effects, the number
of funds, and the number of observations. Overall, the results on the contribution of our
controls are consistent with the literature. The turnover and (NER) are significant negative
drivers of future performance, as in Carhart (1997), which may imply that excessive turnover
increases transaction cost, which, in turn, lowers the value for investors. Funds managers
charging more on the claim that they have superior skills actually decrease the final net
returns for their investors. As Cremers & Petajisto (2009) and Amihud & Goyenko (2013),
we find a weak negative link between the fund’s age (Ln(Age))25 and its abnormal returns.
No significant effect of the funds’ size can be identified.
In line with Amihud & Goyenko (2013), who states that the R2 stemming from a multi-
factor performance regression can be used as a manager “stock selectivity” proxy26, our
results show that the higher the manager’s selectivity (the lower the R2), the higher the fund
subsequent performance. Turning to the positive sign of flows (Flow), the result supports the
findings of Gruber (1996) and the “smart money” effect, thereby investors are able to uncover
skilled managers and invest in their funds. Yet, excessive volatility in the flows (FlowSd) is
detrimental, suggesting that funds having more stable sources of incomes tend to fare better.
We find that excessive volatility negatively impacts future abnormal returns. Eventually, the
natural logarithm of the number of assets composing the portfolio has no explanatory power
over the four-factor alpha.
25Amihud & Goyenko (2013) find no significant effect of age on performance
26The main intuition is that if the R2 is high then the manager is mostly passively tracking the market
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Time fixed effects Yes
Category fixed effects Yes
Number of Funds 2039
Number of observations 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.4 reports the baseline panel regression of the performance measure (alpha 4-factor) on
lagged control variables. LN(Assets) represents the natural logarithm of the number of unique positions
composing the portfolio. Flow designate the net fund level flow in % of the lagged value of TNA and
Flowsd the flow volatility over the previous 12 months. LN(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the fund
TNA and LN(TNA)2 its squared value. LN(Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund age expressed in
years. NER and Turnover represent respectively the prospectus Net expense and turnover ratios. Finally,
R2 is the R-squared of the 4-factor regression and Vol the volatility of the funds returns over the last 24
months. We include time and style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at
the fund level.
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In Table 3.5, we include our SRI variable in the model. Its coefficient is negative, but
not statistically significant. Consistent with the majority of existing academic studies, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that SRI funds’ abnormal returns, once we control for other
characteristics, are not different from their conventional counterparts.27
























Time fixed effects Yes
Category fixed effects Yes
Number of observations 2039
Number of observations 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.5 reports the panel regression of the funds’ performance on controls variables (defined as in
table 2.5) and our SRI dummies. The SRI dummy takes on the value 1 if the funds’ portfolio is in the
top 10% of all funds’ portfolio sustainability score in quarter q, 0 otherwise. We include time and style
fixed effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
27Statman (2000), Bauer et al. (2005), Renneboog et al. (2008b), Derwall et al. (2011), Meziani (2014)
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3.4.3 Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds’ performance
So far, the sample of SRI mutual funds has been assumed to be homogeneous. We relax this
assumption by segmenting both SRI mutual funds and Conventional mutual funds by the size
of their universe. Table 3.6 reports the results. In Column I, the category SRISU is dropped.
In accordance, the coefficients of SRILU , ConvSU , and ConvLU are expressed with respect
to SRISU . All three categories are shown to have a significant positive impact on future
performance. If we consider SRILU and ConvLU , the coefficients are statistically significant
at the 1% level. ConvSU is significant at the 5% level. The sign is positive, that is, all three
categories—including SRI mutual funds with larger universe—perform better than the SRIs
with small universes. The predicted difference in abnormal return between SRI mutual funds
with large universe and small universe is about 0.16%. Turning to Column II, we observe
that SRI mutual funds with large universe not only outperform those with tighter universe
from the same category, but also Conventional funds with small universes (albeit weakly at
the 10% level). The difference is not statistically significant with ConvLU . Column III and
IV reports the results when respectively ConvSU and ConvLU are used as base effect. The
size of the universe is not critical among Conventional funds. While funds broadening their
universe have higher average performance, the results are not statistically significant.
Overall, these results do show that the sample of SRI mutual funds is not homogeneous.
Those with the smaller universe under-perform significantly against Conventional mutual
funds, even though we previously failed to detect any difference when a sustainable invest-
ment strategy was applied. This finding supports our second hypothesis whereby ethical
restrictions are not necessarily detrimental to financial performance as long as the man-
agers are able to expand their universe in other areas (forming their portfolio by choosing a
combination of benchmarks giving access to a large pool of stocks).
3.5 Extensions and Robustness
How robust are these findings? We conduct several robustness tests on the benchmark model.
In this section, we closely scrutinize several important caveats and issues related to our em-
pirical strategy. We deal with potential endogeneity issue before pivoting toward alternative
definitions for creating our main categories: (i) SRI versus Conventional mutual funds as well
as (ii) mutual funds with large and small universes.
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Table 3.6: Investment universe and conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV
SRISU -0.160*** -0.093** -0.126***
(-3.37) (-2.29) (-3.09)
SRILU 0.160*** 0.067* 0.034
(3.37) (1.80) (1.04)
ConvSU 0.093** -0.067* -0.033
(2.29) (-1.80) (-1.42)
ConvLU 0.126*** -0.034 0.033
(3.09) (-1.04) (1.42)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 2039 2039 2039 2039
Number of observations 35455 35455 35455 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.6 reports the panel regressions of the funds’ performance on controls variables (defined as in
table 2.5) and category dummies. SRISU takes on the value 1 if the fund’s portfolio sustainability score
is in the top 10% and if its universe (IU Score) is in the top 50%, conversely SRILU is in the bottom 50%
of our IU Score. ConventionalSU and ConventionalLU follow the same logic but are in the 9 first deciles
of the portfolio sustainability score. We include time and style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on
standard errors clustered at the fund level.
Though the results in the previous section are suggestive, they cannot rule out the possibility
that financial performance influences the adoption of the SRI strategy. In accordance, the
first potential caveat being examined is whether the sustainable score may be endogenous.
Such endogeneity is often disregarded in the literature. However, there are various reasons
why we might suspect the adoption of high SRI standards to result from funds’ performance.
If true, it would lead to double causality and the ordinary least squares estimates reported in
the previous section would be biased. For instance, while migration toward a more sustainable
investment strategy could be fruitful in the long term because of being better suited with
regulatory or customers future requirements, it can be costly in the short term. Such cost
stems from the lack of knowledge or expertise of fund managers when they start implementing
new strategies. To deal with this transition period, mutual funds may choose to do so when
their financial and reputational capital is high. In this case, their performance would explain
their score. An alternative mechanism that could also lead to reverse causality is, contrariwise
to the previous one, that “losers” in the industry aim to change their policy and specifically
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move toward one for which the financial performance could be viewed as less important
(Riedl & Smeets 2017). To confirm that previous estimates are unbiased, we formally test
the presence of endogeneity. As usual, the cornerstone of the testing strategy lies in the choice
of the instrument. Compelling instruments should satisfy both the exogeneity and the validity
condition. As often in economics and finance, the literature on sustainable investment in the
mutual funds industry provides little guidance for the choice of an instrument. The strategy
we propose here is to rely on an instrument inspired from the literature on peers’ effects. The
intuition is that choosing to adopt sustainable criteria for investing could, to some extent,
depend for a given fund on the behavior of its peers. Typically, if a group of mutual funds
(i.e., peers) are set in competition, some of them improving their sustainable score could lead
others to align. Thus, considering the average score of the peers as an instrument directly
is an option. However, as all funds among a peers’ group might respond to each other, the
score the of peers might also depend on the one we aim to instrument. Hence, as known
in the literature on social interactions, group behavior is suspected to be endogenous. An
alternative is to use exogeneous group characteristics. Bearing this in mind, we propose the
age of peers’ funds as a main instrument. We suppose that such variable influences the score
of the peers, without being affected by neither the score of the instrumented fund nor its
performance. Peers group are identified as funds following the same main style (Best match).
For a given quarter, the value of the instrument for a fund i is the leave-one-out mean (i.e.,
mean of the group excluding the fund in question) of its peers in the previous year. Table 3.7
reports the main statistics of our testing procedure. We find that peers’ age has a negative
and significant effect on mutual fund’s sustainable score. The F-stat is equal to 15.98. Based
on Staiger and Stock’s rule of thumb critical value of 10, our instrument can be considered
relevant. Given the nature of the instrument, we are confident about its exogeneity. Still, we
also propose a formal test. The exogeneity assumption requires a second instrument to be
assessed. We use a normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI)28of portfolio weights as
a second instrument in order to perform the Sargan–Hansen overidentification test. Such a
measure enables to focus on the distribution of the weights attached to holdings rather than
the overall level of concentration. Results from Sargan–Hansen test confirm the exogeneity
of our instruments (see Table 3.7). Equipped with our instruments, we conduct an Hausman
specification test to detect endogeneity in the sustainable score. The null hypothesis of no
endogeneity could not be rejected at any usual significance levels whether we consider peers






1−1/N , where ωi is a fund’s portfolio weights and N is the number of unique positions
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Table 3.7: Endogeneity test
Instruments Peer-age HHI Peer-age + HHI
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
First stage
F-statistics of 15.98 0.00 4.84 0.028 10.66 0.00
excluded instruments
Second stage
Sargan-Hansen test / / / / 0.869 0.35
Hausman test 0.60 0.44 2.68 0.102 2.308 0.129
Note: Table 3.7 reports the main statistics of the instrumental variable regression. Peer-age refers to the
average age of a fund’s peers lagged by one year, HHI represents the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman
index of each fund’s portfolio weights lagged by one year. We perform a two stage least square regression
and report the results for the F-test of excluded instrument, the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification
and finally the Hausman test of endogeneity
As a next step, we use alternative category definitions to check how sensitive the results
are to such changes. First, we strengthen our criteria for selecting SRI mutual funds and
consider only those displaying time consistency in their strategy. To do so, we construct a
new variable SRI alt1 taking the value of 1 if a mutual fund is included in the top 10% at
least 60% of the time during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. The resulting SRI alt1
is time invariant as in Renneboog et al. (2008b). Table 3.8 confirms the main findings of
the benchmark results, as SRI mutual funds with the smaller universe (SRI alt1SU) is the
only category under-performing all the others. In this model, the SRI funds with the largest
universe (SRI alt1LU) no longer outperform the conventional ones with the smallest universe
(Conv alt1SU).
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Table 3.8: Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alternative SRI category: Persistent SRI ranking
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV
SRI alt1SU -0.193** -0.116** -0.158***
(-2.44) (-2.13) (-2.91)
SRI alt1LU 0.193** 0.076 0.035
(2.44) (1.09) (0.52)
Conv alt1SU 0.116** -0.076 -0.042*
(2.13) (-1.09) (-1.86)
Conv alt1LU 0.158*** -0.035 0.042*
(2.91) (-0.52) (1.86)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 2039 2039 2039 2039
Number of observations 35455 35455 35455 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.8 reports an alternative setting for Table 3.6 where SRI funds (SRI alt1) are the one whose
observation are at least 60% of the time in the top 10% of the portfolio sustainability score. We include
time and style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
Second, we use a threshold of 20% rather than 10% to define SRI mutual funds at each period
(SRI alt2). Table 3.9 shows the findings are fully consistent with the baseline model (Table
3.6), with the exception of Conv alt2LU , which outperforms Conv alt2SU .
Third, we propose as a final exercise for the SRI category to use data on self-declared sus-
tainable strategy. Differences between the de jure and de facto strategy in general have been
well documented in the literature on mutual funds (Sensoy 2009). Recently, Candelon et al.
(2018) explored the case of sustainable funds. Likewise, we use the “socially conscious” vari-
able constructed by Morningstar from mutual funds prospectus to create an alternative SRI
dummy variable SRI alt3.
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Table 3.9: Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alternative SRI category: Top 20% of the sustainability score
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV
SRI alt2SU -0.076** -0.022 -0.063*
(-2.16) (-0.64) (-1.82)
SRI alt2LU 0.076** 0.054* 0.013
(2.16) (1.91) (0.63)
Conv alt2SU 0.022 -0.054* -0.041*
(0.64) (-1.91) (-1.69)
Conv alt2LU 0.063* -0.013 0.041*
(1.82) (-0.63) (1.69)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 2039 2039 2039 2039
Number of observations 35455 35455 35455 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.9 reports an alternative setting for Table 3.6 where the SRI funds (SRI alt2) are in the
top 20% of the sustainability score. We include time and style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on
standard errors clustered at the fund level.
The results are reported in Table 3.10. Overall, the findings are less clear-cut. In particular,
while SRI funds with larger universes outperform those with smaller universe, we can no more
identify a difference between SRI alt3SU and Conventional mutual funds. An explanation
could be that some self-declared funds use the SRI label as a marketing devise without truly
enforcing it in their investment policy, making the distinction with the conventional category
more blurry.
Fourth, we change our definition of investment universe. To create our category, we directly
use the number of associated benchmarks instead of summing up their assets. To filter out
some of the noise, we restrict our measure to benchmarks having an overlap of at least 10%
with fund’s portfolio. The small universe category corresponds to one or two associated
benchmarks (SU alt1). Funds with more than two associated benchmarks fall into the large
universe category (LU alt1). Table 3.11 shows that the coefficient attached to SRISU alt1 is
negative and statistically significant in all regressions confirming our main conclusion.
Fifth, as discussed in section 3, we cannot rule out noise in our investment universe score.
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Table 3.10: Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alternative SRI category: Self-declared socially conscious mutual funds
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV
SRI alt3SU -0.100** -0.014 -0.057
(-2.22) (-0.36) (-1.42)
SRI alt3LU 0.100** 0.085** 0.042
(2.22) (2.35) (1.39)
Conv alt3SU 0.014 -0.085** -0.043*
(0.36) (-2.35) (-1.88)
Conv alt3LU 0.057 -0.042 0.043*
(1.42) (-1.39) (1.88)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 2039 2039 2039 2039
Number of observations 35455 35455 35455 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.10 reports an alternative setting for Table 3.6 where the SRI funds (SRI alt3) are self-
declared. We include time and style fixed effect and t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at
the fund level.
Because we are not interested in the value of the score by itself, but in the resulting ranking
of funds, the problem can be of limited importance. Ultimately, what we wish is to avoid
misclassification (i.e., include a fund in the wrong category) or to keep it as negligible as
possible. In the benchmark model, mutual funds with a IU score above (below) the median
fell into the large (small) universe category. Here, we use an alternative way to translate
the score into the categories which should be more robust to the presence of noise. The
variable (SU alt2) takes the value of 1 a mutual fund belongs to the bottom 30% of the
distribution, and 0 otherwise. The variable (LU alt2) takes the value of 1 if the mutual fund
belongs to the top 30% of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. We add for technical reasons
a new category (MU alt2) for funds located in the middle of the distribution bearing in
mind that our main objective is to mitigate the risk of misclassification between the small
and the large universe categories. Table 3.12 confirms our main finding as it singles out SRI
funds associated with the smaller universes of investment. This category is the only one to
significantly under-perform all five others at the 1% level. SRI funds having large universes
perform equally to Conventional funds with a large universe.
84 3.5. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
Table 3.11: Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alternative IU categories: Number of associated benchmarks
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV
SRISU alt1 -0.105* -0.104** -0.118**
(-1.91) (-2.00) (-2.37)
SRILU alt1 0.105* 0.001 -0.013
(1.91) (0.04) (-0.41)
ConvSU alt1 0.104** -0.001 -0.014
(2.00) (-0.04) (-0.61)
ConvLU alt1 0.118** 0.013 0.014
(2.37) (0.41) (0.61)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 1874 1874 1874 1874
Number of observations 31264 31264 31264 31264
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.11 reports an alternative setting for Table 3.6 where the universe size is computed as the
number of styles to which the funds as at least 10% of portfolio overlap. SUalt1 funds have at most 2
associated benchmarks where LUalt1 funds have more than 2. We include time and style fixed effect and
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
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Table 3.12: Conditional effect of SRI on mutual funds performance
Alternative IU categories: Extreme deciles
Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1 Alphat+1
I II III IV V VI
SRISU alt2 -0.203*** -0.253*** -0.164*** -0.170*** -0.226***
(-3.07) (-3.73) (-2.77) (-2.92) (-3.71)
SRIMU alt2 0.203*** -0.050 0.039 0.033 -0.023
(3.07) (-1.08) (0.91) (0.91) (-0.62)
SRILU alt2 0.253*** 0.050 0.089** 0.083** 0.027
(3.73) (1.08) (1.97) (2.17) (0.73)
ConvSU alt2 0.164*** -0.039 -0.089** -0.006 -0.062*
(2.77) (-0.91) (-1.97) (-0.22) (-1.85)
ConvMU alt2 0.170*** -0.033 -0.083** 0.006 -0.056**
(2.92) (-0.91) (-2.17) (0.22) (-2.57)
ConvLU alt2 0.226*** 0.023 -0.027 0.062* 0.056**
(3.71) (0.62) (-0.73) (1.85) (2.57)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Funds 2039 2039 2039 2039 2039 2039
Number of observations 35455 35455 35455 35455 35455 35455
t-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Table 3.12 reports an alternative setting for Table 3.6 where the universe size is 3 specific categories:
SUalt2 (from the 1
st to 3rd decile of the IU Score), MUalt2 (from the 4
th to 7th decile of the IU Score) and
LUalt2 (from the 8
th to 10th decile of the IU Score). We include time and style fixed effect and t-statistics
are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
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3.6 Conclusion
We propose an empirical strategy to test the conventional wisdom stating that socially re-
sponsible investment funds (SRIs) should under-perform with respect to their conventional
peers, since the former must choose securities from a smaller universe. We show that this
narrative is poorly grounded in the mutual fund industry in which most mutual funds, in
practice, do not consider all tradable assets when investing, but follow specific investment
styles (e.g., small cap or large-value) that already restrict their investment universe. Against
this background, the question we ask is whether restrictions in an investment universe im-
posed by sustainability considerations can be compensated for in other areas such as following
styles associated with a large pool of assets.
To address this question, we develop an original measure of investment universe based on
a matching procedure between the portfolio holdings of US equity mutual funds and style
benchmarks provided by Morningstar (e.g., value, growth, large cap, financial). Morningstar
benchmarks embed nearly 100% of tradable stocks in the US market. Overall, our proce-
dure enables to recover a score, labelled IU Score, reflecting the size of investment universe
of 2,039 US equity mutual funds, updated quarterly, from 2012Q4-2018Q4. We match this
information with mutual funds sustainability score provided by Morningstar and sustaina-
lytics to construct four categories: SRI mutual funds with smaller universe (SRISU), SRI
mutual funds with larger universe (SRILU), Conventional mutual funds with smaller universe
(ConvSU) and Conventional mutual funds with larger universe(ConvLU).
Our results show that there is no difference in risk adjusted performance between SRI funds
and conventional funds when we control for state-of-the-art characteristics and we consider
SRI as an homogeneous group. If we break down the set of SRI mutual funds into two
subgroups with respect to their universe, we show that only SRI mutual funds with the
smallest universe consistently underperformed other categories. The selection of the style
appears therefore as critical for SRI managers to minimize the side effect of restrictions
imposed by their ethical goals. This finding is robust to a battery of robustness checks in
which we alter the definition of our main categories (i.e., SRI vs Conventional mutual funds
and large vs small universe). We also test for reverse causality.
General Conclusion
As I have demonstrated in this thesis, active management remains a very topical subject and
the debate regarding active management and managerial skills is far from being settled. The
evolution of the market and notably the rise in popularity of passive strategies have forced
active managers to adapt in order to remain competitive. As previously stated, this sparked
a renewed interest regarding active management and the mechanisms set in place by active
managers to try to outperform their peers or the market persistently. The three chapters I
articulated in this thesis aimed to provide new insights on these recent development which
can be broadly summarised along two main threads: (i) The ability of some funds to deviate
from their peers in order to generate excess risk adjusted performance and (ii) The role of
the investment universe size and strategy breadth in mitigating diversification issues. First
lets recall the current state of the literature regarding these two concepts.
Peer deviation: In recent years, peer deviation (i.e strategy distinctiveness) has attracted
its fare share of attention from academics worldwide, given that it is used as an active
management proxy. Part of the literature focuses on market based data to compute such
distinctiveness, either by computing the correlation of a funds returns to the average returns
of its peers (see, Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017) or by measuring the
funds exposure to idiosyncratic risk through a multi-factor model (see, Huij & Derwall 2011,
Amihud & Goyenko 2013). However, even though market based data have the benefits of
being easily accessible at relatively high frequency, they cannot provide a clear picture of how
managerial choices translate into distinctiveness. Hence, other studies uses portfolio holding
to evaluates peer deviation (see, Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Cremers & Petajisto 2009, Choi et al.
2017). While information on holdings are much harder to obtain and to consolidate, they
provide a more potent opportunity to evaluate managerial skill and strategy distinctiveness.
For instance, Cremers & Petajisto (2009) propose to measure peer deviation by assessing
the dissimilarity of a managers portfolio allocations with respect to the one of its referen-
tial benchmark. Similarly, Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Choi et al. (2017) propose to measure
the proportion of the portfolio (i.e. the level of concentration) invested in specific styles ,
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industries or countries with respect to the corresponding categories in the market portfo-
lio. Finally, these studies provided new evidences that funds which tends to correlate less
to their peers or depart from the common portfolio allocation schemes are able to outperform.
Investment universe and strategy breadth: One of the principal of modern portfo-
lio theory pertains to the necessity to hold shares of a wide variety of individual securities
to diversify away the portfolio idiosyncratic risk. Yet, in practice most managers operate
on a subsection of the market on which they presumably have a better expertise: the so
called “styles”. Interestingly, high profile researches in the last few years actually found evi-
dence than managers concentrating their investment in few industries or countries where they
have informational advantages are able to outperform their competitors, corroborating J.M.
Keynes’s view on investment principles. These observations led new studies to investigate
how some managers were able to focus their investment without worsening diversification
to a point where it would become detrimental. Huij & Derwall (2011) based on Grinold &
Kahn (2000) provided the first answer to the question by relating portfolio concentration
to strategy breadth (i.e the number of separate risk exposures), they uncovered than funds
concentrating their holdings exposures through multiples risk factors (namely style, sector
and country risk factor) were outperforming their competitors whose exposure were either
focused on one or two sources.
On a related issue, diversification or the lack thereof, has also been at the debate regarding
SRI funds performance. Indeed, the restrictions imposed by ethical criteria followed by the
manager could supposedly worsen portfolio’s efficiency and systematically lead ethical man-
agers to under-perform their more conventional counterparts. Yet, contradictory evidences
have been unearthed by academics worldwide, some pointing to their actual out-performance
(see for instance, Nofsinger & Varma 2014), while others finding evidence of their under-
performance (see, Renneboog et al. 2008a, El Ghoul & Karoui 2017, Ciciretti et al. 2019).
Yet, the majority of the studies found no statistical evidence of difference in performance
from SRI funds and non-SRI funds (Bauer et al. 2005, Barnett & Salomon 2006, Gregory &
Whittaker 2007, Meziani 2014, Dolvin et al. 2019).
Each chapter developed in this thesis, though they rely on different data, models and re-
search questions, is a variation of the two concepts described above. In what follows, I wish
to re-establish where each chapter’s contribution lies and provide some avenues for future
researches.
Chapter 1 proposes to take care of several empirical caveats mainly overlooked in the lit-
erature on mutual funds performance and peer distinctiveness. First, we propose to en-
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dogenously determine each funds’ peers using an adaptive clustering approach (AFFECT)
developed by Xu et al. (2014) and then apply Sun et al. (2012)’s SDI measure to compute
their strategy distinctiveness. This method relies on a limited set of assumptions and ad-
dresses issues regarding changes in the number of styles, funds’ shifts in style, and the entry
and exit of funds. Second, we apply Ardia & Boudt (2018) approach to formally test the
difference in performance across peers, it allows to retrieve results robust to multiple testing
issues and formally check whether performance is due to luck or actual skills (Barras et al.
2010). Third, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first study to assess the impact of
strategy distinctiveness in the context of European EMFs. Fourth, we explore the non-linear
relationship between financial performance and strategy distinctiveness and find that being
too distinct or distinguishing oneself too fast from its peers (migration risk) destroy the
added value of strategy distinctiveness. Turning to potential further researches, one could
investigate alternatives to the SDI. Indeed the measure is simple and straightforward yet
a distinctiveness measure based on portfolio average characteristics (e.g. TNA, manager
tenure, fund’s ownership , etc.) rather than returns correlation could provide new insights
on the drivers of strategy distinctiveness and further consolidate the results.
Chapter 2 builds on the same premise than chapter 1, namely the intuition than peers de-
viation is at the heart of successful active strategies, yet deepens the analysis by focusing
on the funds’ portfolio holdings characteristics. More precisely, we use portfolio holdings to
estimate the portfolio concentration but depart from the literature in the way we asses it.
We propose to analyse portfolio concentration alongside two complementary axes : stock
concentration and the number of risk exposures. While the former is straightforward to
compute with a Herfindahl Index on portfolio positions (see Baks et al. 2007, Fulkerson &
Riley 2019), the later requires a more careful analysis. Hence, we propose to use a novel
methodology —inspired from recent developments in the risk budgeting literature— which
endogenously determines uncorrelated risk factors and their relative importance to the port-
folio risk exposures. The underlying idea is to distinguish truly uncorrelated sources of risk,
thanks to a PCA in order to compute the strategy breadth, or in other words the diversity of
the underlying strategy. The contributions are three-folds: First it provides an alternative to
benchmark-centric measures, thus allowing to take into account multi-benchmarks strategies
using portfolio holdings (Amihud & Goyenko 2013). Second, to the best of our knowledge
this is the largest data set of European mutual fund holdings data consolidated yet, as such
it allows to study a completely different set of funds and strategies than the one usually
used in US focused researches. Three, directly related to the second point, the methodol-
ogy is much more flexible than traditional multi-factor models (Huij & Derwall 2011, Choi
et al. 2017) to accommodate a vast diversity of funds investing either globally, internationally
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or domestically, as it is the case in the EU market. Or main results highlights that funds
concentrating their holdings yet spreading their risk exposures on multiple uncorrelated risk
sources are significantly outperforming the rest of the market, thus alleviating the diversifi-
cation issue linked to a concentrated portfolio. However, one remaining drawback pertains to
the identification of the uncorrelated endogenous risk factors. Further studies could provide
an alternative to the PCA to uncover the endogenous factors and link them to worldwide
economic-based ones. We suggest looking at Meucci et al. (2015) latest work on minimum
torsion bets which provide an interesting framework to do so.
Finally Chapter 3 investigates the idea than SRI funds are subject to under-performance
relatively to common funds as their investment universe is restricted. However, as stated
above most funds already operates on sub-market segments, this raising the question: why
should an ethical restriction be any different than a style restriction? To provide an an-
swer to this question, we propose a novel methodology to assess the investment universe
size and label our measure the IU Score. Our hypothesis is that —similarly to other invest-
ment constraints— ethical restrictions might reduce one’s investment universe, yet that some
managers are able to mitigate this issue by investing in larger style (providing a sufficient
amount of stock opportunities) or across multiple ones. Similarly to chapter 2, we use port-
folio holdings information to assess how managers may alleviate concentration issues (here
restricted universes). However, in this study we propose to compute the investment universe
size, an observe whether it allows to maintain a sufficiently high level of diversification for the
funds to remain competitive. Our results highlight that SRI funds having a small investment
universe are indeed under-performing the rest of the market, while their counterpart with
larger universes are performing as well as conventional funds with large universes and even
outperforming conventional funds with small investment universes. As such, our results allow
to link seemingly contradictory results found in the literature, by introducing the investment
universe size. Given that the literature on ethical funds is much more recent, there are still
many research avenues to investigate. First, expanding the analysis the non-US funds could
provide more information on whether or not the current academic consensus on SRI perfor-
mance is driven by US specific characteristics. Second, the liquidity dimension of such funds
has been overlooked in the literature and could provide very interesting new insights on SRI
vs Conventional funds characteristics. Third, the difference in exposition to quality factors
may also be further examined to explain SRI funds performance, as their ethical criteria are
supposedly driving them to high quality firms.
To summarise, the present thesis not only provides new evidence of skilful active management,
but provides alternatives tools to distinguish it. On the one hand, we argue that it allows
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academics to build on these novel measures to unearth new market dynamics, and on the other
hand investors to distinguish different drivers of successful active strategies more effectively.
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Béreau, S., Casteleyn, A., Gnabo, J.-Y. & Zwinkels, R. (2015), Commonality among eq-
uity mutual funds: impact on financial stability and price discovery, in ‘Working Paper
UNamur’.
Berk, J. B. & Green, R. C. (2004), ‘Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets’,
Journal of political economy 112(6), 1269–1295.
Borgers, A., Derwall, J., Koedijk, K. & ter Horst, J. (2015), ‘Do social factors influence
investment behavior and performance? evidence from mutual fund holdings’, Journal of
Banking & Finance 60, 112–126.
Boyle, P., Garlappi, L., Uppal, R. & Wang, T. (2012), ‘Keynes meets markowitz: The trade-
off between familiarity and diversification’, Management Science 58(2), 253–272.
94 Bibliography
Brands, S., Brown, S. J. & Gallagher, D. R. (2005), ‘Portfolio concentration and investment
manager performance’, International Review of Finance 5(3-4), 149–174.
Brown, S. J. & Goetzmann, W. N. (1997), ‘Mutual fund styles’, Journal of financial Eco-
nomics 43(3), 373–399.
Brown, S. J. & Goetzmann, W. N. (2001), Hedge funds with style, Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Bussière, M., Hoerova, M. & Klaus, B. (2015), ‘Commonality in hedge fund returns: Driving
factors and implications’, Journal of Banking & Finance 54, 266–280.
Candelon, B., Hasse, J.-B. & Lajaunie, Q. (2018), Sri: Truths and lies, Technical report,
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Appendix A: Overview of the EEMF market
A.1: Country-based analysis
Figure 1.1 shows the number of active mutual funds comprising our sample over time and
dispatched by countries. A visual inspection shows marked differences in our sample, with
Luxembourg and France accounting for more than 50% of EEMFs (see also Table 1.3). On the
contrary, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia together account for only 2%. These percentages
are in line with Graef et al. (2018) based on 1,464 funds, and we account for 4,957. The
equity mutual funds’ domicile used in the study is based on Morningstar.
With this in mind, we turn to the evolution of the EEMF market and note both the similarities
and the differences across countries. First, taken as a whole, the industry displays two
separate phases. The first is an expansion phase from 1999 to the end of 2008. During
this period, the number of funds in Europe increased sharply to reach an all-time high of
3,497 from 1,310. This trend subsequently vanishes, and the industry enters a stabilizing or
slightly contracting phase. In December 2016, there were 3,049 funds, down by 13% from the
historical peak. A more careful inspection enables us to separate contrasting behaviors across
countries. The global picture is partially driven by Luxembourg, in which the expansion phase
was particularly marked. The same applies to Ireland. Both countries experienced strong
growth in the number of local funds that materialized into significant market share gains.
Figure 1.2 displays the market share per country over time. France and Germany maintained
a fairly similar market share throughout our sample. No comparable pattern is observable
for Italy and Spain, which lost some ground relative to other nations during 1999–2016.
Following 2009, the number of funds decreased in Italy and Spain, remained fairly stable in
Luxembourg, Germany, and France, and increased slightly in Ireland.
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Figure 1.1: Total population of funds by country
Note: Figure 1.1 reports the total number of funds by country from 1999 to 2016.
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is worth noting that we cannot, using our data,
formally identify the underlying factors driving the diverging trends. Nevertheless, from
the literature on mutual fund developments, we can recall some established features and
overcome them with respect to our figures. Traditionally, the mutual funds industry has
responded to various factors (e.g., capital inflows from investors) that can be sensitive to
competition from alternative investment vehicles such as Exchange traded funds and the
market environment. The two factors are drivers of the liability and asset sides of mutual
funds (Vozlyublennaia & Wu 2017). More recently, changes in regulations have also been
mentioned as determinants of mutual fund development amid the implementation of the
MiFiD II regulation that has been blamed by the industry for dramatically raising operating
costs and penalizing small-scale structures. Our data show that the dates of the successive
turning points correspond to financial events consistent with some of the drivers previously
mentioned, especially the burst that caused the so-called European debt crisis. Moreover,
the 2007–2009 financial crisis rooted in the U.S. economy had a significant impact on the
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Figure 1.2: Relative population of funds by country
Note: Figure 1.2 reports the share of funds by country from 1999 to 2016.
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EEMF market when considering the number of active mutual funds. In 2016, there was a
slight decrease in the number of mutual funds that could correspond to the implementation
of regulatory reforms within MiFiD. However, in this descriptive phase, we cannot formally
isolate the effect of regulation from other factors. Regarding cross-country comparisons,
one way to interpret the heterogeneity in our data is to consider the location of mutual
fund investments. Our sample includes both mutual funds engaged primarily in foreign
investments and funds with an informational advantage engaged in local investments29. For
instance, mutual funds in Luxembourg are known to follow a worldwide strategy (Lang
& Köhler 2011). By contrast, Italy and Spain host mutual funds investing both abroad
and locally. As a result, the strong impact of the European crisis on these two countries
may have spilled over to local mutual funds. Mutual funds in Luxembourg, along with
France and Germany, resisted the European turbulence more forcefully because of either
lower dependence on the local market or the better resilience of their domestic economy to
the crisis. Interestingly, Ireland, whose economy was dramatically hurt in 2008 and 2010
(Whelan 2014), experienced an expansion of mutual fund activity. This finding supports the
notion that mutual funds with an international investment strategy were better protected
between 2008 and 2011.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 complete the picture by considering total AUM as well as the average
size of equity mutual funds per country. We now analyze whether a particular segment of
the market and, specifically, small-scale funds, were more affected by successive changes in
the economic and regulatory environment. As expected, the evolution of total AUM is more
volatile than the number of funds. Although remaining relatively low, the AUM increased
dramatically in 2005 and continued to grow until the end of 2007. The occurrence of the
U.S. financial crisis seems to have reverted the trend because AUM sharply declined from
approximately e800 billion in 2007 to approximately e275 billion in 2009. Next, the EEMF
industry resumed its growth until 2016 with two temporary episodes of slight decreases in
2011 and 2016. Figure 4 reports the average fund size. We observe a marked difference from
the previous graph. In particular, from 1999 to 2002, although the industry was smaller
than the rest of the sample, average size was large. Therefore, this period was marked by
a concentration of the market with a limited number of large players. Unsurprisingly, the
crisis affected the stock market and value of the EEMF portfolio. Average size rebounded
early during the crisis and started to grow again from 2009. Regarding total AUM, the
upward trend was halted twice, in 2011 and in 2016. Overall, no evidence from these results
show that the architecture of the mutual funds industry has been markedly distorted across
29As discussed in the literature, mutual funds possess local knowledge and privileged contacts with com-
panies and market participants (see Shukla & Van Inwegen (1995)).
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Figure 1.3: Total TNA per country
Note: Figure 1.3 reports the total TNA (in eBn) of funds by country from 1999 to 2016.
time. There is widespread concern in the industry that increasing demand from regulators
might lead to the consolidation of the global funds industry to maintain profitability. In our
data, we do not pick up on an eviction of small funds following the implementation of new
regulations.
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Figure 1.4: Relative TNA per country’s population of funds
Note: Figure 1.4 reports the share of funds by country from 1999 to 2016 and the total
TNA (in eBn) of each of our funds’ domicile country weighted by the number of funds
available in this particular country.
A.2: Country-based analysis
The previous subsection discusses country-based categories. In this section, we explore the
key features of the EEMF industry by considering style-based classifications. As presented in
Section 3, our methodology enables the recovery of the number and composition of clusters
over time. Recall that mutual funds included in the same cluster exhibit close dependence
in their returns. One way to interpret these clusters is to consider that they group mutual
funds that follow the same style and, as such, those set in competition. Figure 1.5 displays
the number of style-based clusters from 1999 to 2016. On average, the industry can be
divided into 13 styles. After a sharp decrease around the dotcom bubble, their number
remains relatively stable over time, with slight decreases in 2008, 2011 and 2016. Our result
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points to an interesting feature. While more products have been made available in the
industry EFAMA (2017), we find that it eventually goes along with more similarity in their
returns. This finding should be further investigated with the help of portfolio holding data,
for instance. This direction of research is, however, left for future investigations.
Figure 1.5: Time-varying cluster number
Note: Figure 1.5 reports the optimal number of clusters computed by the adaptive ap-
proach from 1999 to 2016.
Figure 1.6 reports the size of the style-based clusters over time. The y axis displays the decile
to which each cluster is attached. Each cluster is represented by a circle whose size and color
reflect the number of mutual funds included. Large clusters appear in 2001 and their number
continues to increase. The largest structures are concentrated between 2007 and 2011. For
instance, we count 1,170 mutual funds in a single cluster in March 2009. After 2012, we
count a maximum of 966 institutions in a cluster. However, we observe more clusters in the
last decile, supporting increased industry concentration.
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Figure 1.6: Size of style-based cluster
Note: Figure 1.6 reports the total number of funds (reported in deciles) by cluster from
1999 to 2016.
Figure 1.7 indicates the cluster size considering total AUM per cluster instead of the number
of institutions. Two periods emerge. First, we observe strong concentration in the industry
between 2007 and 2008. Next, the market becomes more fragmented before again displaying
signs of increased concentration in 2011 and 2015. Larger clusters are visible in 2007–2008
and 2015–2016. Overall, we consistently find periods of strong integration that could go
along with increased competition in 2001–2003, 2007–2008, and 2015–2016, characterized
by a lower number of styles, more populated clusters, and larger sizes, along with phases
of fragmentation in which we observe a stable number of smaller clusters, measured by the
number of funds and smaller funds, as in 2005–2007 and 2011–2013.
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Figure 1.7: Total TNA of style-based cluster
Note: Figure 1.7 reports the average funds’ TNA (reported in deciles) by cluster from 1999
to 2016.
Next, we analyze the distinctiveness strategy of funds. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 display (i) the size
of clusters as measured alternatively by the number of funds and AUM, along with (ii) the
average SDI per cluster. Clusters with the highest average SDI are displayed in the upper
part of the figure. By contrast, the most homogeneous clusters are displayed in the lower part
of the figure. From the two figures, we do not observe a clear correlation between the level of
distinctiveness and cluster size. For instance, in 2016, a large cluster is highly homogeneous,
whereas in 2013, a fairly large cluster is heterogeneous. This bivariate analysis result tends
to suggest that distinctive strategies are not more likely in a more populated and competitive
environment.
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Figure 1.8: Cluster mean SDI vs. number of funds
Note: Figure 1.8 reports the average funds’ SDI (reported in deciles) and number of funds
by cluster from 1999 to 2016.
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Figure 1.9: Cluster mean SDI vs. total capitalization
Note: Figure 1.9 reports the average funds’ SDI (reported in deciles) and TNA by cluster
from 1999 to 2016.
In the next figure, we compute the distinctiveness of the clusters themselves. To this end,
we compare the average return of the entire industry with the average return of the cluster.
Figure 1.10 shows the results. More distinct clusters are reported on the upper part of the
figure. Clusters more in line with the rest of the industry are displayed in the lower part of
the figure. The size of the circle depicts the average distinctiveness of the components of the
cluster. Here, too, we cannot isolate specific regularities. For instance, in 2005, the two most
distinct clusters are highly homogeneous and heterogeneous.
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Figure 1.10: Cluster mean SDI vs. Cluster SDI
Note: Figure 1.10 reports the average Cluster-SDI (reported in deciles) and funds’ average
SDI by cluster from 1999 to 2016.
A final aspect that we discuss in this section concerns the dynamic nature of our system
and, more specifically, changes in the composition of clusters and the SDI measure. An
implicit assumption in the analysis is that funds select their style in the first place. Then,
they proceed to make “marginal” adjustments in strategy to distinguish themselves from
competing peers. In accordance, we should observe a high level of inertia in the composition
of clusters and greater variability in the distinctiveness measure. Note, however, the two
are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, we can show the persistence of the mutual fund
cluster and whether such persistence has evolved over time. On average, a fund in two
consecutive periods remains in the same cluster with an 85% probability. That is, 85% of
funds at time t remain in the same cluster at time t+1. This finding supports the principle
of inertia previously discussed. If we observe the evolution of this indicator, we see that
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persistence has exhibited strong consistency over time (Figure 1.11). Hence, the minimum
match between two periods was achieved in 2000 (65% consistency).
Figure 1.11: Cluster stability across time
Note: Figure 1.11 reports the average stability in clusters’ funds composition from one
period to the next.
